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Meinhard Doelle* From Kyoto1 to Marrakech2;
A Long Walk through the
Desert: Mirage or Oasis?
This article reviews the results of four years of negotiations of the parties to the UNFCCC,3
from the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 to the Marrakech Accords in 2001. This process
was intended to provide the details and operational rules needed for parties to make
decisions on whether to ratify and how to implement the Kyoto Protocol in time for the start
of the first commitment period in 2008. The author analyzes the Marrakech Accords with
respect to the Kyoto Mechanisms, reporting, verification, compliance, and developing
country issues, and concludes that the Kyoto Protocol in itself is a negligible step forward
in terms of both the environmental and equity goals of the UNFCCC. It does provide,
however, the best chance for international progress on these issues, in that it should
serve as a pilot phase to address some of the fears and concerns preventing parties from
taking more meaningful action. It has the potential to serve as a basis for separating
useful tools from those that should not become part of the long term international response
to climate change. Perhaps most importantly, it should serve as a mechanism to focus
negotiations on the major unresolved issues, such as how to fairly distribute emissions of
greenhouse gases at levels that do not threaten the global climate system.
Cet article examine les rdsultats de quatre anndes de n6gociations entre les membres la
CCCCNU en commengant avec la convention du protocole de Kyoto signde en 1997 et
se terminant avec les accords de Marrakech en 2001. Le but de ce processus 6tait de
fournir les details et les r,'glements opsrationnels permettant aux membres de prendre
des decisions quant.J la ratification du protocole de Kyoto, ainsi que sa mise en vigueur
pendant la pdriode convenue, soit en 2008. L'auteur examine les accords de Marrakech
en tenant compte des mdcanismes de Kyoto--compte rendu, verification, adhesion, et
questions intdressant les pays en voie de ddveloppement-et en arrive . la conclusion
que le protocole de Kyoto est insignifiant en ce qui concerne les objectifs visant
I'environnement et I'dgalitd du CCCCNU. Toutefois, ceci est un moyen de progresser sur
la scdne internationale en agissant comme un projet-pilote pour adresser les inquidtudes
qui empdcheront les groupes de prendre des mesures significatives. Ce processus
ddterminera ressentiel quant aux mesures portant sur les changements climatiques. Mais
plus encore, ceci servira de mdcanisme pour viser les questions importantes non rdsolues,
telles que la distribution equitable des emissions de gaz 6 effet de serre 6 un niveau qui
ne menace pas le systdme climatique mondial.
Of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University The author has been a non-governmental member of the
Canadian Delegation since the spring of 2000. He would like to thank David VanderZwaag at Dalhousie Univer-
sity, Jutta Brunne at the University of Tornto, and Matthew Bramley of the Pembina Institute for their very
thoughtful comments on drafts of this paper.
1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCCOR, 3rd Sess.,
Annex, UN Doe. FCCC/CP/7/Add.I (1998) at 7, 37 I.L.M. 22, online: UNFCCC<http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/cop3/07a01 .pdf> [Kyoto Protocol or Protocol].
2. UNFCCC, The MarrakechA ccords & The Marrakech Declaration (2001) [unpublished, advance unedited
version], online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/cop7/documents/accordsjdrafLpdf>] [Marrakech Accons]. The
advance unedited version contains all decisions made at Marrakech, and puts into legal text the political decisions
made in Bonn at COP 6 bis.
3. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change OR, 5th Sess., Annex, UN Doc. A/AC.237/I 8(PartI])/Add. 1
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 849, online: UNFCCC <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/a/18p2a01.pdf> [UNFCCC or The
Framework Convention].
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Introduction
When the Kyoto Protocol4 was signed in December of 1997, it was her-
alded by some as a landmark in negotiations on climate change5 and mul-
tilateral environmental agreements more generally. It included, for the
first time, binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases. This is
4. For an overview of the Kyoto Protocol, see Michael Grubbet al., The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and
Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999).
5. See Roger Ballentine, "Kyoto An Important First Step in Fighting Warming" (2000) 17:3 The
Environmental Forum 39; Thomas Richichi, "Although Storm Clouds Threatened Throughout the Glo-
bal Warming Conference in Kyoto, the Conferees Reached an Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions" (1997) 20:18-19 Nat'l L.J. 134(col 1).
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particularly noteworthy given that it committed Parties to the pursuit of an
environmental objective that would have an impact on almost every aspect
of life. Kyoto was seen as fundamentally different from other agreements,
such as the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting 6 substances, in that it
tackled an environmental issue for which there were no obvious techno-
logical fixes. It was considered unlikely that the climate change issue
could be fully addressed without confronting the emerging reality that de-
velopment had become unsustainable. Compliance with these targets was
expected to create significant net short-term economic costs for developed
countries. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated at a time when
the scientific debate on the results of anthropogenic emissions was ongo-
ing,7 indicating some recognition of the precautionary principle introduced
in the Rio Declaration.8
6. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, amended
at London on 29 June 1990, amended at Copenhagen on 25 November 1992, amended at Vienna in
1995, amended at Montreal on 17 September 1997, and amended at Beijing on 3 December 1999,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 42, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force I January 1989), online:
United Nations Environment Programme <http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/Montreal-
Protocol2000.pdf>.
7. At the same time, climate change had even by 1997 been studied more than most other environ-
mental issues. There is general recognition that our climate system is so complex that accurate
predictions on the precise impact of GHG emissions will not be possible for the foreseeable future in
spite of an incredible amount of scientific research on this issue. For a comparison of the state of the
science between 1997 and 2001, compare the Second and Third Assessment Report Series of the
IPCC: IPCC SecondAssessment Climate Change 1995: A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John T. Houghton et
al., eds., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group I
to the Second Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, England.
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert T. Watson, Marufu C. Zinyowera & Richard H. Moss,
eds., Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change: Scientific-
Technical Analyses: Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996); James
P. Bruce, Hoesung Lee & Erik F. Haites, eds., Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimen-
sions of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Robert T. Watson et al., eds., Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report: A contribution of Working
Groups 1 II and III to the ThirdAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John T. Houghton et al., eds., Climate
Change 2001: The Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the ThirdAssessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); James J. McCarthy et al., eds., Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation
& Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the ThirdAssessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Bert Metz et al., eds., Climate Change 2001: Mitigation: Contribution of Working Group III
to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
8. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN CEDOR, Annex, Agenda Item 21, UN
Doc. A/CONF.151/26fRev.1 (1992) at principle 15 [Rio Declaration].
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Others have been more critical of the Protocol, especially with re-
spect to the relatively modest targets set, and the flexibility mechanisms
included that will allow countries to offset emissions in their own coun-
tries by funding reductions elsewhere. 9 Much of the criticism relates to
what has taken place since December 1997. First of all, the Montreal Pro-
tocol had set a precedent in international environmental law of quick rati-
fication and amendments in response to new scientific information to make
the agreement more effective in reaching its environmental objective. 0
This has not happened with the Kyoto Protocol. On the contrary, it has
taken six years for most of the Parties crucial to the coming into force of
the Protocol to ratify it. " Furthermore, the agreement reached in Kyoto is
now seen as having been significantly watered down between 1997 and
2001,12 while the science on the cause and effect of climate change has
become stronger.'3
The Kyoto Protocol set the framework for the acceptance of legally
binding targets, and it included specific emission reduction targets for each
country included in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change.'4 Much of the detail remained unresolved, however,
and it became clear soon after Kyoto that the detail was needed not only to
implement the Protocol, but that ratification by Annex I5 Parties would
not be forthcoming until these outstanding issues were resolved. Negotia-
tions on these issues have taken four years. They were concluded in No-
vember 2001 in Marrakech, a full year after a self-imposed deadline.
9. See e.g. Chris Rolfe, "Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Guide to the Protocol and Analysis of its Effectiveness" (1998). online: West Coast Envi-
ronmental Law Association <http:www.wcel.org/wcelpub/ 1998/12152.htnl>.
10. See Elizabeth R. DeSombre, "The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remark-
able, and Remarkably Particular" (2001) 19 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 49.
11. See The Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 25. Romania became the first Annex I country to
ratify in 2000. As of Dec. 2003, 120 countries have ratified the Protocol, including most Annex I
countries. For the Protocol to come into force, either Russia.or the United States has to ratify.
12. For copies of a variety of position papers by the Climate Action Network and its member orga-
nizations, see the CAN website: <http://www.climatenetwork.org/>. One issue of particular note in
this regard has been the use of land use change and forestry activity under Article 3.4 of the
Kyoto Protocol.
13. See Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and Third
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 6.
14. Supra note 3 at 26.
15. Ibid. Note that the targets agreed to by Annex I countries are included as Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol. The reference to the Parties, however, continues to be to Annex I of the Framework Con-
vention, given that the Kyoto Protocol consistently makes this reference back to Annex I of the
Convention, other than for purposes of reference to the specific targets adopted.
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What was planned in the Buenos Aires Plan ofAction16 to be a three
year process leading to a final agreement in November 2000, turned into a
long walk through the desert after the failure of negotiations in The Hague.
This year in the wasteland of international diplomacy and bargaining fi-
nally lead to the Marrakech Accords agreed to by Parties in the early morning
hours of 10 November 2001. The question raised in this article is whether
the Marrakech Accords offer a way out of the desert. Do they provide a
meaningful way forward on climate change for the international commu-
nity? Will the agreements reached in Marrakech ensure ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol? Did negotiators find an oasis in Marrakech, or will they
continue to wander aimlessly through the desert? This article provides an
analysis of the agreement reached in Marrakech, what it means for the
Kyoto Protocol and for international efforts to address climate change.
The UNFCCC provides the context for this analysis of Kyoto and
Marrakech. It set the tone for the negotiations, and has set the framework
both in terms of process and substance. The role of Kyoto and Marrakech
in developing an international response to climate change is therefore con-
sidered in the context of the goals set out in the UNFCCC. The focus in
this analysis is on the following goals and objectives set out in the UNFCCC.
Article 2 sets as the overall goal of the UNFCCC to stabilize "greenhouse
gas concentrations at levels that prevent dangerous human interference with
the climate system, ensure that the rate of change allows nature to adapt,
does not threaten food production and allows sustainable development to
take place."
This overall goal is then refined through principles set out in Article 3,
including equity for present and future generations, common but differen-
tiated responsibilities, and the precautionary approach. The merits of these
goals and principles are assumed for purposes of this article. Finally, for
purposes of this analysis, the author has accepted the third assessment re-
port of the IPCC as the most credible source on the science; it is the source
on which the parties to the UNFCCC agreed to rely in their efforts. This is
done in the full recognition of the ongoing scientific debate on whether the
IPCC has been too cautious or too aggressive in its predictions.
16. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, held at Buenos Aires from 2 to 14
November 1998. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Fourth
Session, UNFCCCOR, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add. 1 (1999) [Buenos Aires Plan ofAction].
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I. History of Negotiations
In December 1997, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to the text of the Kyoto
Protocol, the first international agreement on binding emission reduction
targets for greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol included maximum
emissions on a country by country basis for developed countries for the
time period of 2008 to 2012. The emissions targets were based on 1990 as
a base year. This meant countries had to limit their emissions during the
five years from 2008 to 2012 so that the average emissions would be no
more than the target set for that country in the Kyoto Protocol. While the
target is generally seen as an annual target, it is actually a five-year target
based on emissions in 1990. Cumulatively, these country specific targets
are to result in reductions of emissions in developed countries of about 5%
below 1990 levels. The U.S., for example, accepted a target of -7%. This
means if it ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it will have to reduce its average
emissions during this five-year period to 7% below its 1990 emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol then provides some guidance on what countries can
and cannot do to meet their targets. For example, the Protocol allows coun-
tries to offset emissions by actually removing greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere. Processes that achieve this are generally referred to as sinks.
The Protocol also allows some flexibility to trade emission reductions.
This means if one country can achieve reductions beyond those required to
comply with its own target, it can sell those reduction to another country,
which will then be able to use those reductions to meet its own target.
There are three mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol to accommodate this.
They are the clean development mechanism, joint implementation, and
emissions trading. These Kyoto mechanisms are addressed in more detail
below. They function to allow parties to separate the question of where the
reductions are achieved from which party can count the reductions in achiev-
ing its emission reduction target.
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol provides for assistance to developing coun-
tries to facilitate their efforts to reduce emissions. This is particularly im-
portant given that developing countries were not allocated reduction tar-
gets in the Protocol.
These are the basic building blocks of the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto only
provides the basic building blocks: the three credit trading mechanisms,
the use of sinks to offset emissions, and general provisions for assistance
to developing countries, such as recognizing the common but differenti-
ated responsibilities of parties to contribute to the solution. The detail was
left to the Marrakech Accords.
Four long years passed from the signing of the Kyoto Protocol to the
agreement in Marrakech. While it was clear from the outset that ratifica-
tion and implementation of the Protocol would take time, no one could
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have predicted the events of the twelve months leading up to Marrakech.
The first three years post-Kyoto had gone more or less according to plan,
with Parties slowly negotiating toward agreement on the rules that would
operationalize the Kyoto Protocol, and would enable UNFCCC Parties to
make an informed decision about ratification. The time frame for this was
identified in the Buenos Aires Plan ofAction, agreed to at the Conference
of the Parties (COP) 4 in 1998.1" The plan was developed in recognition
that in order to allow sufficient time for Parties to meet their commit-
ments, the Protocol should come into force by 2003 at the latest. This
would leave two years following the coming into force of the Protocol for
countries to demonstrate progress toward their targets, and five years until
the start of the first commitment period. According to the Buenos Aires
Plan ofAction, therefore, agreement on the rules necessary to operationalize
the Kyoto Protocol was to be reached by COP 6 in November 2000 in The
Hague.
Cracks in this plan began to appear in the last meeting of the subsidiary
bodies prior to COP 6,18 when it became clear that over time Parties' inter-
pretations of the Protocol were becoming more and more divergent. The
sheer number of unresolved issues heading into COP 6 made an agreement
exceedingly unlikely. Uncertainty over the outcome of the U.S. presiden-
tial elections also seemed to haunt the COP 6 negotiations. Deep and fun-
damental divisions among the main negotiating blocks crystallized. In very
broad terms each of the three major negotiating blocks had, by then, carved
out an overall negotiating basis that proved fundamentally at odds with
those of the other two. The Umbrella Group (UG)' 9 had focussed its posi-
tion on economic efficiency of the mechanisms. The European Union (EU)
was presenting its position in the context of the environmental integrity of
the Protocol. The G-77 and China 0 focussed on equity for developing coun-
17. Ibid.
18. Part I of the Thirteenth Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies was conducted from II to
15 September 2000 in Lyon, France. For an overview of the negotiations in Lyon and The Hague, see
Lavanya Rajamani, "Air and Atmosphere, Re-negotiating Kyoto: A review of the Sixth Conference
of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change" (2000) Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y
201 (Yearbook).
19. The Umbrella Group (UG) consists of The United States, Russia, Japan, Canada, Australia,
Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, and at times the Ukraine. The United States remained a participant
in the UG even after President Bush decided not to ratify the Protocol. New Zealand, Norway and
Iceland voted against the UG position in the last days of negotiations in Marrakech, and the Ukraine
seemed more aligned with the CG II negotiating block (consisting of eastern European countries) in
Marrakech than with the UG. This left Russia, Japan, Canada and Australia as the core of the UG for
purposes of negotiations in Marrakech, four countries with a very different view on how the Protocol
should be operationalized, and due to the ratification formula, with an incredible bargaining position
to dominate the negotiations.
20. The G-77 consists of most developing countries, including small island states, oil producing
countries, and the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and South America.
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tries. With the EU and G-77 finding considerable common ground in the
negotiations leading up to and in The Hague, the UG seemed to be more
and more isolated. Each side seemed convinced that it would prevail if it
just continued to hold out on all issues, and that the other negotiation blocks
would give in eventually. By the time Parties realized this would not hap-
pen, and real negotiations started at COP 6 in The Hague, it was too late,
and no agreement was reached.2'
While the timetable for the Buenos Aires Plan ofAction could thereby
not be met, Parties did agree to pick up the pieces at a special negotiation
session referred to as COP 6 bis. Failure of the negotiations in The Hague
was not initially seen as a fatal blow to the Protocol. By the spring of 200 1,
however, the Bush administration in the U.S. confirmed publicly what many
had suspected: that it had no intention of initiating the ratification process
in the U.S., and would not participate in any further negotiations on the
Protocol. The administration feared harm to the U.S. economy and refused
to enter into an international agreement on climate change that would bind
the U.S. without also binding developing countries.22 With the single larg-
est emitter and most powerful nation out of the process, the Kyoto Protocol
seemed doomed.
The initial reaction from close trading partners of the U.S., such as
Japan, as well as Australia and Russia, seemed to be that without the U.S.
they would also not ratify the Protocol. Efforts by the EU, supported by
Canada and other UG countries, prior to the resumptions of COP 6 nego-
tiations in July 2001 in Bonn, however, prevented any formal decision by
any party other than the U.S., and allowed negotiations to continue under
the Kyoto Protocol. This was in part due to the efforts of the EU and others,
and in part due to the absence of any concrete alternative proposal by the
U.S. administration leading up to Bonn. Nevertheless, expectations for Bonn
were low. Surprisingly, the EU came into the negotiations with a very dif-
ferent approach than it had in The Hague eight months earlier. It essen-
tially offered the UG most of what it had demanded in The Hague in return
for reaching an agreement on the major outstanding issues. This was ac-
complished in Bonn, and the detail was worked out at COP 7 in Marrakech.
The G-77 Parties were offered some concessions on development assis-
tance, but developing countries were otherwise not a major factor in terms
21. See Sean S. Clark, Mark C. Trexler& Laura H. Kosloff, "Installment Six of the Climate Treaty
Debate: A Report on COP-6" (2001) 15 Nat. Resources & Env't 180.
22. For information on the U.S. position on climate change, see the U.S. EPA website <http://
www.epa.gov>. The initial positions of the British Administration are summarized in a position pa-
per entitled Climate Change Review (2001), online: U.S. EPA <http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNM7H/$File/bush ccpol_61101 .pdf>.
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of influencing the outcome of negotiations after The Hague.
Based on the negotiating positions of the Parties crucial to the coming
into force of the Kyoto Protocol (Japan, Russia, and the EU),23 it still seems
likely that the Kyoto Protocol will come into force in 2004 without the
participation of the U.S. This is a remarkable turn of events, not only be-
cause it will have succeeded without participation from the most powerful
nation, but because, without the U.S., ratification by almost every Annex I
country is required to bring the Protocol into force.
24
In an effort to bring countries such as Japan, Russia, and to a lesser
extent Australia and Canada, on board, many concessions were made, par-
ticularly by the EU and the G-77. What is left of the Kyoto Protocol? Will
it be effective? Will it be fair? Does it set a framework for effective long-
term action to reduce human impact on the climate? Can it survive without
the U.S.? Will other countries ratify the Protocol without U.S. participa-
tion? While an in-depth analysis of these questions is beyond the scope of
this article, and will undoubtedly be the subject of research in this area for
years to come, these questions are explored in a preliminary manner below.
II. What To Expect From Marrakech, Desert or Oasis?
With the conclusion of negotiations on the issues raised in the Buenos
Aires Plan ofAction, the focus of the international community will likely
now shift to implementation. With this shift into a new phase, it is timely
to consider how much was accomplished in the negotiation phase just con-
cluded, a phase that took us from a framework convention with general
statements of objective in 1992 to binding targets and detailed rules on
how to meet them in 2001.
In this context, the article poses the general question: how much progress
toward the goals and objectives of the UNFCCC are Kyoto and Marrakech
likely to provide to the international community? What is the role of Kyoto
and Marrakech in meeting the goals and objectives of the framework
convention?
23. There is a general expectation that European countries other than EU members and Russia, who
are also needed to bring the Protocol into force, will ratify.
24. See The Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 25. The U.S. represents about 35% of Annex I emis-
sions, Russia about 17%, Japan about 9%, Australia 2%, Canada 3%, and most of the rest split
between the EU and eastern European countries. This means, assuming ratification by the EU and
eastern Europe, Russia and Japan are key to the Kyoto Protocol coming into force. This data is based
on information in the first national communications of Parties under the UNFCCC, submitted on or
before II December 1997, and used in the negotiations on Article 25.
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In considering this issue, the article considers the following specific
questions:
1. Assuming ratification and compliance, what is the role of the Kyoto
Protocol in achieving the environmental and equity goals set in
the UNFCCC? In answering this question, the focus will be on the
targets taken on by developed country parties as well as the vari-
ous mechanisms available to these parties to meet their targets.
2. Are the reporting/monitoring/verification procedures sufficient to
ensure the integrity of the obligations taken on? The answer to this
question involves an assessment of the rules negotiated for Ar-
ticles 5, 7, and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.
3. Is the compliance system strong enough to ensure a reasonable
level of compliance, especially considering uncertainty over who
will ratify, the economic uncertainties, and the limited capacity in
many countries to implement obligations in the Protocol?
III. What Do The Marrakech Accords Mean For The Kyoto Protocol?
1. The Kyoto Mechanisms25
The Kyoto Protocol includes as alternatives to domestic action a number
of so-called flexibility mechanisms available to Annex I countries to supple-
ment domestic action with reductions outside their own jurisdictions. The
three mechanisms established for this purpose are the Clean Development
Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and Emissions Trading. The analysis
of these mechanisms is directly relevant to the first question posed, the
role of the Protocol in achieving the environmental and equity objectives
of the framework convention. In this context, it will be important to con-
sider whether these mechanisms undermine the environmental objectives
of the UNFCCC, or whether they assist in bringing countries into the pro-
cess in an equitable, constructive and meaningful way.
The Kyoto Mechanisms were included in the Protocol, at least in part,
in recognition that the country-specific targets agreed to for Annex I coun-
tries provided only a crude tool of balancing the relative economic cost of
25. For a general discussion of the issues related to the mechanisms, see Sophia Tsai, "Air and Atmo-
sphere: UNFCCC Technical Workshop on Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocor" (1999) colo. J. Int'l
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 220 (Yearbook).
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Parties to reduce emissions. Only after the conclusion of the first commit-
ment period will a thorough analysis of the relative economic costs and
benefits to the respective Parties to the Protocol be possible. In the mean-
time, the mechanisms provide a release valve to ensure that if one country's
target is disproportionately expensive to achieve, it can delay reductions in
its own country and instead support reductions in another country. This
objective is partly met through all three mechanisms, but primarily through
emissions trading.
Another objective for at least two of the mechanisms was to address
capacity building issues in developing countries and economies in transi-
tion, which are expected to make major capital investments in energy-pro-
ducing technologies in the near future. Inherent in the inclusion of these
mechanisms was a recognition that influencing the choices made at this
stage might have significant long-term benefits. This applies to develop-
ing countries that are at a stage in their development where their energy
needs are likely to increase significantly in the years to come. The mecha-
nism established for this purpose is the Clean Development Mechanism.
This concept also applies to economies in transition, which refers to east-
ern European States with economies that fell apart after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and which are in the process of rebuilding their economies.
The mechanism established to facilitate this process for economies in tran-
sition is Joint Implementation.
a. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)26
The Clean Development Mechanism was a last minute addition to the
Kyoto Protocol.27 The basic concept was to give Annex I countries a
release valve if domestic action became too expensive, and to provide
developing countries with much needed development assistance in the
form of technology transfer and economic activity. Parties agreed that
if reductions could be achieved more cost-effectively in a developing
26. For a general discussion on CDM, see Richard Stewart et al., The Clean Development Mecha-
nism: Building International Public-Private Partnerships Under the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc.
UNCTAD/GD5/GF5B/Misc.7 (2000) at 9; William L. Thomas, Daniel Basurto & Gray Taylor, "Cre-
ating a Favorable Climate for CDM Investment in North America" (2001) 15 Nt. Resources & Env't
172; Sean Michael Neal, "Bringing Developing Nations on Board the Climate Change Protocol:
Using Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Implement the Clean Development Mechanism" (1998) 1 lGeo.
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 163.
27. See Jacob Werksman, "The Clean Development Mechanism: Unwrapping the 'Kyoto Surprise'
(1998) 7 Rev. Eur. Community & Int'l Envtl. L. 147.
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country that has no reduction target,2 that country should be able to
join forces with an Annex I country 29 to achieve those reductions. Thus,
the reductions would count toward the target of the Annex I country. In
turn, the Annex I country provides assistance to the developing coun-
try to achieve reductions that would otherwise not have been realised.
It became quite clear through the four years of subsequent negotia-
tions that putting this fairly simple concept into practice would be a
challenge. The main question for purposes of this article is what bal-
ance the CDM strikes between retaining the environmental integrity of
the developed country targets and starting the process of bringing de-
veloping countries into the process of emissions reductions.
i. Baselines
One of the main challenges with CDM projects in the negotiations has
been to determine how emissions in a host country compare with and
without the CDM project. The challenge is how to predict at the time
the CDM project is certified what the host country would have done
without the project.3" This requires the establishment of a baseline for
the CDM project against which the emissions from the project are to
be measured to determine whether (and how much) emissions have
been reduced by the project.
Provisions regarding baselines for CDM are contained in the An-
nex to the Marrakech decision on modalities and procedures for a clean
development mechanism at paragraphs 45 to 52. 1' The options for
methodologies are set out in paragraph 48. Under this provision, project
participants, which include the host and funding Parties, may choose a
28. It is assumed, therefore, that the developing country has no direct, short-term incentive to make
the reductions. Certainly, no such direct incentive exists under the Protocol itself. The question of
what a developing country would do, however, in the absence of assistance under this mechanism is
a very difficult question to answer, and would have to consider other motivations for taking action to
reduce emissions, including, but not limited to, the possibility of a future target, or an effort to
demonstrate to Annex I countries that their efforts are inadequate, and not based on best efforts.
29. Annex I countries have emission reduction targets under the Protocol, and thereby an incentive
to support efforts to reduce emissions, if they can get credit for the reductions realized.
30. Either for the life of the proposed CDM project or even just until the end of the first commit-
ment period.
31. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMR I (Article 12), Annex, paras. 45-52
at 83-84.
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methodology for establishing a baseline for a project from the follow-
ing options:
1. existing actual or historical emissions;
2. emissions from a technology that represents an economically
attractive course of action, taking into account barriers to
investment;
3. the average emissions of similar project emissions of compa-
rable project activities undertaken in the previous five years in
like circumstances and whose performance is among the top
20 percent of their category.
The first option is most likely to be applied for energy efficiency
or conservation projects, or for straight energy source replacement
projects. Given that CDM projects are likely to combine economic de-
velopment and GHG emissions reduction, it is more than likely that
CDM project activities will be associated with an increase in overall
energy consumption, which makes the first option unattractive to project
participants as a baseline. For most CDM projects, Parties are there-
fore more likely to rely on options two and three. The net effect of this
approach to establishing baselines is an overall overestimation of the
emissions reductions achieved from CDM projects. Negotiators clearly
decided to err on the side of encouraging CDM projects over protect-
ing the environmental integrity of the Annex I targets.
ii. Projects Consistent With Sustainable Development?
A second very controversial issue has been the question of what types
of projects should qualify for the CDM. What factors other than the
project's impact on greenhouse gas emissions should be considered?
Does it matter whether the project is otherwise environmentally sound?
Does it matter whether the project assists the host country in its effort
to become sustainable, or to remain sustainable? Who gets to decide
whether a project meets any of these criteria? What is the role of the
public, either internationally or locally, in making this determination?
Should there be standards set for environmental assessment process
requirements to consider these issues and ensure public access to the
decision-making process?
The Marrakech Accords deal with these issues in the following
manner. The host party is given the final decision-making authority to
determine whether the project activity assists it in achieving sustain-
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able development.3 2 One exception to this is that Annex I Parties agreed
to refrain from using reductions achieved from nuclear projects.33 While
this approach may seem reasonable on the surface, and was argued on
the basis of the sovereignty of developing countries to choose their
own path to sustainability, there are a number of serious flaws in this
reasoning.
The practical implication of this part of the Marrakech Accords
will be that a developing country will be approached by an Annex I
country or a private company with an offer that is linked to a specific
technology or project. The "choice" of the host country at that point
will be to decide whether to look a gift horse in the mouth and turn
down the offer of assistance, or to take what is being offered. The sug-
gestion that the host developing country is in a position to make a
sound objective decision about what is consistent with sustainable de-
velopment is naive at best. Secondly, this approach makes no distinc-
tion between countries where individuals affected by a proposed project
have a voice and an opportunity to be heard and influence the decision
made by the host country, and the many countries around the world
where that is not likely to happen.
Furthermore, the suggestion that international involvement to en-
sure that CDM projects are consistent with sustainable development
poses a threat to the host country's sovereignty is also not defensible
on closer examination. The effect of international oversight into the
question of sustainability of the project, is not a question of imposing
anything on the host countries, but rather is about whether the interna-
tional community is prepared to recognize the greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions achieved from the project as an alternative to domestic
action in an Annex I country. In the name of host country sovereignty,
this approach would force the international community to accept cred-
its for a project that creates other environmental problems while re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions. How this is less of a sovereignty
issue for members of the international community than conditions
placed on assistance to a host country is difficult to follow.34
32. See ibid., Decision -/CP7(Article 12), Preamble at 68.
33. The same principle applies to Joint Implementation projects. Nuclear energy projects are there-
fore also excluded from Jl.
34. This was the basis on which the UG was arguing against the development of any criteria for the
types of projects to be accepted under the CDM. It is interesting to note that the technologies sup-
ported by many UG countries are technologies that likely would have had difficulty surviving close
scrutiny under sustainability criteria.
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The one alleviating factor to reduce the pressure on host countries
to accept undesirable technologies is that under the Marrakech Ac-
cords unilateral CDM projects appear to be permitted. This would al-
low developing countries to seek out private companies who are in
possession of technology that the host country chooses to adopt, and
try to develop CDM projects on their own. The battle throughout the
negotiations on this issue was really a battle over market access be-
tween the EU and the UG for technologies that these countries are able
to offer. Not surprisingly, given the lack of past efforts on greenhouse
gas emission reductions domestically, UG countries have few tech-
nologies to offer in this regard. The few technologies with the poten-
tial to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have raised serious concerns
from a sustainability perspective. Examples include nuclear power
plants, large scale hydro projects, clean coal technology, and forest
plantations as sinks' projects. 5
From the perspective of consistency, fairness, and environmental
integrity, it would have been clearly preferable if Parties had made a
collective decision about what technologies either do or do not qualify
as environmentally sound. This could have streamlined the environ-
mental assessment process, by focussing on site-specific concerns. It
could also have started the much needed process of getting out of com-
partmental thinking and reaction to one symptom at a time rather than
confronting the fundamental problem of too many human beings caus-
ing too much environmental harm in meeting their needs and wants.36
Agreement here could have reduced the risk that action on climate
change through the CDM at the international level will come at the
expense of biodiversity and sustainability.
One of the alternative solutions proposed by some countries for
addressing these concerns about the effects of CDM projects in the
host countries was to include requirements for meaningful environ-
mental assessments and public participation, both in terms of the local
35. The EU and the G-77 put forward proposals on positive or negative lists at COP 6 in The Hague
in 2000. The positive list was proposed as a list of projects that would be eligible
for CDM credits. The proposed list contained mostly projects which were likely to involve EU com-
panies. The alternative propose, a negative list of projects that would not be eligible, contained projects
such as nuclear plants, large scale hydro, coal plants, etc., mostly projects UG companies were likely
to be interested in. As a result, the list approach was dropped, and an opportunity to streamline the
eligibility and verification process without compromising the environmental objective of the CDM
mechanism, was lost.
36. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Bradley A. Harsch, "Consumerism and Envi-
ronmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture" (1999) 26 Ecology L.Q. 543.
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and the international public. These proposals lost out in the name of
reducing the cost of going through the CDM verification process, which
was based on a legitimate concern that the cost of complying with the
process requirements may more than offset the incentive provided by
the credits, particularly with the expected lower price of carbon as the
result of a combination of Russian Hot Air, and the loss of the major
buyer, the U.S. What was lost, unfortunately, in the negotiations, was
the opportunity to streamline the process without giving up on the idea
of environmentally sound projects, as discussed above. In addition,
the problem can also be solved through an international commitment
to require meaningful environmental assessments for all international
projects, thereby eliminating the concern that CDM projects would be
unable to compete.37
In conclusion, in the context of the first question posed at the out-
set, it is clear that equity and the environment lost out to reducing the
cost of generating CDM credits. This, in combination with the diffi-
culties in establishing baselines, raises some serious questions as to
whether the CDM process is likely to live up to its "hype" of serving
the dual role of making compliance cheaper for Annex I parties while
assisting developing countries without undermining environmental
objectives.
iii. The Process And Other CDM Issues
The fourth major challenge was who would control the process, and
who would be making decisions on how to apply the modalities for
baseline and verification to a particular project? Would it be a politi-
cal process or one based on expertise? Would there be regional repre-
sentation based on general UN practice, based on whose interests were
at stake, or would the selection process for the body established to do
this work be based on proven expertise and impartiality?
The body set up under the Marrakech Accords to implement the
CDM is the CDM Executive Board.38 Under paragraph seven, the Ex-
ecutive Board will be made up of ten members to be elected by the
conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol (COP/MOP). Non-Annex I countries will have a majority on
37. In the Canadian context, this has been a controversial debate in the context of the application of
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1999, C. 33, to the Canadian International Devel-
opment Agency (CIDA), and the Export Development Corporation (EDC).
38. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 12), Annex, Part C at 74.
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the Executive Board. Members are to be selected based on their tech-
nical and policy expertise, and be elected in their personal capacity,
not as representatives of their countries. Meetings of the Executive
Board are open to the public, and documents are to be made available
to the public.
The validation of individual CDM projects is actually not carried
out by the Executive Board, but rather by operational entities accred-
ited by the Executive Board.3 9 These operational entities have the re-
sponsibility to validate CDM project activities and verify actual emis-
sions against the established baseline.4 ° The Executive Board oversees
this process by means of annual activity reports submitted by each
operational entity. Operational entities will be retained by project par-
ticipants to carry out the validation and verification and report the
results to the Executive Board. The Executive Board formally regis-
ters the CDM project after its review of the report of the operational
entity. There are limits imposed on the time period during which cred-
its can be issued for a given project.
4'
Participation in a CDM project is voluntary. If a party chooses to
participate, however, Part F42 of the Annex requires it to have a desig-
nated national authority as a body responsible for CDM project in-
volvement of that country. Credits from CDM projects can be earned
effective from the year 2000. Baseline and credit approval can take
place as soon as the Executive Board has completed the accreditation
of operational entities to carry out that process. Sinks projects under
CDM are limited to afforestation and reforestation projects, and no
Annex I country can use more than the equivalent of 1% of its as-
signed amount from sinks credit under the CDM to meet its first com-
mitment period target.43 The rules for afforestation and reforestation
projects under the CDM were developed by the 9th Conference of the
Parties in the fall of 2003. Finally, 2% of the certified emission reduc-
tions are to be set aside under an adaptation fund to assist developing
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of cli-
mate change.44
39. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP.1 (Article 12), Annex, Part D at 77.
40. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 12), Annex, Part E at 78.
41. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 12), Annex, Part G, para. 49 at 84.
42. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. 1 (Article 12), Annex, Part F at 79.
43. See ibid., Decision -/CP7 (Article 12), para. 7 at 70.
44. See ibid., Decision -/CP.7 (Article 12), para. 15 at 71.
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b. Joint Implementation (JI)45
Joint implementation has only limited relevance for the issues raised
on this article. Only a brief summary is therefore provided. Joint imple-
mentation is in many ways a mixture of Emissions Trading and the
Clean Development Mechanism directed at economies in transition.
It actually consists of two tracks, one resembles emissions trading,
and the other is project-based and resembles the Clean Development
Mechanism. The reason for the two tracks is that there was concern
among Annex I countries who were interested in joint implementation
activities that some of the countries with economies in transition would
have capacity problems with respect to some of the eligibility require-
ments for emissions trading.
46
The main difference between the two tracks is who gets to verify
the additionality47 of emission reduction units to be issued to the fund-
ing party. For track one, this is done by the host country, based on the
principle that because it has its own target to meet, there is no incen-
tive for the host country to overestimate the reductions achieved. Track
two is based on the assumption that the host country does not know
where it stands domestically; it has not met an eligibility requirement
(such as annual reporting on emissions based on accepted standards),
and is therefore essentially treated like a Non-Annex I country with-
out an emissions reduction target. This means the involvement of a JI
Executive Board similar to the CDM board, and a similar role for op-
erational entities to validate the project and verify emission reductions.
While there are some minor differences between each of the tracks
and their corresponding mechanisms, due to the similarity a detailed
review of JI is not warranted as part of this study.
45. See ibid., Decision -/CP.7(Article 6) at 54; ibid., Draft decision -/CMP.I (Article 6) at 54. For a
more detailed discussion on joint implementation, see e.g. Glenn Wiser, "Joint Implementation: In-
centives for Private Sector Mitigation of Global Climate Change" (1997) 9 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev.
747; Alex G. Hanafi, "Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an Effective Interna-
tional Program to Combat Climate Change" (1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441; Chester Brown,
"Facilitating Joint Implementation under the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Toward a
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Protocol" (1997) 14 Envtl. and Planning L. J. 356.
46. The issue of mechanisms' eligibility is discussed in the general section on the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms, Section 4.1. 1, above. The specific requirements for reporting on emissions and sinks is dis-
cussed in the context of Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, Section 4.3, below.
47. Additionality refers to the need to verify that the reduction credits claimed are additional to any
reductions that would have taken place without the joint implementation project. There are different
ways to define additionality, one is financial, others may look at technology or other ways of deter-
mining what would have happened without the joint implementation of the project. The project may
not have taken place, the project may have gone ahead with higher emissions, or the project may have
gone ahead without change.
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One point of note is that JI projects cannot earn credits until 2008,
whereas CDM projects can earn credits effective 2000. A JI project
can, however, similarly to CDM projects, be approved as soon as the
administrative structure, including the Executive Board, is established.
c. Emissions Trading (ET)4"
On the one hand, emission trading is the most straightforward of the
three mechanisms, in that it deals with the exchange of credits be-
tween Annex I countries only. It does not involve the creation or vali-
dation of new emission reduction or sequestration credits, nor is it
concerned with baselines. It simply allows Annex I countries to ex-
change the right to emit greenhouse gases during a given commitment
period. 49 On the other hand, this is where the whole mechanisms sys-
tem created under the Kyoto Protocol comes together, and this created
some unique challenges for the negotiation of the Marrakech Accords.
It is also here that the issues raised in all three questions come to a
head. It is here that crucial decisions were made about the environ-
mental integrity and equity of the Kyoto Protocol. It is here that moni-
toring, reporting, verification and compliance all come together to
determine the effectiveness of the overall process being established
through Kyoto and Marrakech.
i. Fungibility
The term fungibility is one of a number of new terms introduced in the
course of negotiations leading up to Marrakech. Fungibility refers to
the interchangeability of emissions or sequestration credits. For UG
Parties, the objective of the negotiations was to ensure that a tonne of
carbon could be traded on the open market, and that there would be no
difference in value depending on whether that credit was generated
through a Clean Development Project, Joint Implementation, or whether
it was part of the assigned amount a party was allocated based on its
48. For a discussion of emissions trading in the Canadian context, see Andrew Bachelder, "Using
Credit Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions" (2000) 9 Envtl. Law and Practice 281; and
Richard B. Stewart, James L. Connaughton & Lesley C. Foxhall, "Designing an International Green-
house Gas Emissions Trading System" (2001) 15 Nat. Resources & Env't 160.
49. It is important to note that the Marrakech Accords indicate that the Kyoto Protocol does not
grant any title or entitlement to emissions (see Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Decision -/CP.7
(Mechanisms), Preamble at 51). Nevertheless, the assigned amount, any removal units, and emis-
sion reduction credits generated under the Kyoto Protocol are recognized to grant a right to a party
holding those units to emit greenhouse gases subject to the rules set out in the Marrakech Accords.
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Kyoto target. The difficulty with this is that many Parties did place
different relative values on credits depending on how they were gener-
ated. In addition, there were policy objectives other than the creation
of an open low transaction cost market in carbon credits that were in
conflict with this objective.
As a starting point, there was general agreement that if a country
was able to reduce its emissions to below the assigned amount,50 any
portion of the assigned amount not required for compliance could be
traded under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The question was to
what extent other credits generated would be treated differently for
trading purposes. To answer this seemingly straightforward question,
Parties had to address a number of specific issues that proved compli-
cated and difficult to overcome. How much of the action taken by
Annex I countries to meet their emission reduction targets would be
taken domestically?5' Should the same conditions apply to AAU's,
CER's, ERU's and RMU's52 with respect to the right to carry over un-
used credits to future commitment periods?53 Who should be held li-
able in case a party sells credits it actually needs for its own compli-
ance? Should trading take place between Parties only, or should pri-
vate entities be permitted to trade any or all of the credits generated?
These issues were resolved in the Marrakech Accords generally in
favour of unrestricted trading, with a few largely symbolic measures
to address competing concerns about the environmental integrity of
the trading system developed. Parties are free to trade CER's and RMU's
in addition to being able to trade part of their assigned amount. Trad-
ing can be between Parties and can involve private entities. There is a
limit imposed on banking of CER's,54 and banking of RMU's is prohib-
50. The assigned amount means the emissions a country is permitted to release during a commit-
ment period solely based on the emission reduction target it accepted, without considering additional
credits generated through the use of sinks, the Clean Development Mechanism, or Joint Implemen-
tation.
51. This issue is generally referred to as supplementarity. It arises out of the Kyoto Protocol Ar-
ticles 6(d) and 17, which essentially state that use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to do-
mestic action, but do not quantify what is supplemental or even whether this is a mandatory, quanti-
tative requirement.
52. AAU's refer to Assigned Amount Units, CER's are Certified Emission Reductions, ERU's refer
to Emission Reduction Units, and RMU's are Removal Units. These units refer to various types of
carbon credits generated under the Protocol. See Section 4.3, below, for a more detailed discussion.
53. This is generally referred to as banking, and is generally permitted under Article 3.13. Banking
allows a party to retain credits generated during the first commitment period and use them to meet its
second commitment period target, rather than forcing it to trade all credits it does not require for
compliance to another party.
54. The limit for CER's is 2.5% of a party's assigned amount.
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ited. This is, however, merely symbolic given that the Marrakech Ac-
cords do not prevent recycling, whereby a party would keep CER's and
RMU's for compliance purposes and bank its assigned amount units
instead.5
ii. Commitment Period Reserve (CPR)
5 6
The commitment period reserve is a compromise solution to a prob-
lem that was a major stumbling block in the negotiations, and a par-
ticularly obvious illustration of the different visions Parties brought to
the negotiations. In the context of the questions posed at the begin-
ning, it was also a choice between effective compliance and an effec-
tive trading system. The concern expressed by the G77, the EU and a
number of other countries was that a country might decide to oversell,
keep the revenues generated from the overselling, fail to comply, and
then refuse to accept the consequences of noncompliance, or even leave
the Protocol altogether. While the worst case scenarios must be con-
sidered unlikely, given that the Protocol will not operate in an interna-
tional vacuum, there is a real risk that a party, whether intentionally or
as a result of an error in judgement or an unforeseen event, will sell
more than it can afford to. This in turn would create a challenge for the
compliance system that may be difficult to resolve. Given the limited
enforcement mechanisms available, preventing such problems was
considered crucial by many.
During the course of the negotiations, a whole range of solutions
were proposed to this problem, ranging from absolute seller liability
to absolute buyer liability.57 The problem with buyer liability from a
market perspective is that carbon credits will inevitably have different
values attached to them depending on the source, A buyer will con-
sider the likelihood of the originating country failing to meet its target
in deciding what price it will be willing to pay, in recognition of the
55. Recycling can circumvent all these measures given that the amount of credits generated through
the Clean Development Mechanism and the use of sinks will be considerably less on average than the
amount of emission credits held by a party based on its target, the assigned amount. The limitations
placed on banking only become an issue for a party that holds CER's and RMU's that are in total
close to or higher than the actual emissions of that party, without counting any of the assigned amount
units held by that party. This is why, in practice, the limits imposed on banking of RMU's and CER's
are merely symbolic.
56. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Decision -/CP 7 (Article 17) Annex, para. 6 at 99.
57. Seller liability essentially means that the country that oversells is out of compliance. This means
relying on the compliance system for incentive and motivation not to oversell. Buyer liability would
mean the buyer of the credits could not use the credits to meet its commitments. This would place an
incentive on the buyer of credits to ensure that the seller has not oversold.
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risk that in case the originating country oversold, the credits are worth-
less. On the one hand, this means that buyer liability can be a very
effective means of promoting compliance, because ability to demon-
strate compliance affects the price a country will be able to get for
credits it wishes to sell, and buyer liability imposes a responsibility on
the buyer of the credit to become part of the compliance effort to pro-
tect its investment. On the other hand, buyer liability would have de-
stroyed the concept of an open market.
What was agreed to in the end was a compromise. As long as a
party keeps a reserve of 90% of its assigned amount, or 100% of its
most current reviewed emissions inventory (whichever is less), the
principle of seller liability applies. Parties are discouraged from sell-
ing below those levels. If a party sells below those levels, buyer liabil-
ity applies, which means the buyer will not be able to use those credits
unless the seller restocks its reserve to above 90% of the assigned
amount or 100% of emissions. The reference to 100% of emissions
allows countries whose actual emissions have dropped by more than
10% below their target to sell more of their assigned amounts. 8 The
buyer liability approach on the CPR has been operationalized through
the use of a transaction log which tracks the trading of any AAU, ERU,
CER, and RMU. Part of the tracking process will include calculation
of the status of the seller's CPR status at the time of transaction. This
means that the transaction log will notify the potential buyer if the
seller's CPR reserve has dropped below the required minimum. In that
case, the buyer can terminate the sale or proceed with the understand-
ing that the credits cannot be used by the buyer until the seller has
replenished its CPR.
One final note on the commitment period reserve. The EU and the
G-77 had taken the position that compliance with the reserve limits
should be an eligibility requirement for access to the mechanisms gen-
erally. This would mean that in case of a country overselling, not only
would the buyer not be able to use the credits, but the seller would be
prohibited from any further selling until the commitment period re-
serve was replenished. This proposal was rejected by the UG, and was
not included in the Marrakech Accords.59 In terms of the questions
posed in this article, the compromise struck has the effect of limiting
58. It is expected that this will apply mainly to economies in transition, such as Russia, whose
emissions have dropped to 70%-80% of 1990 levels as a result of the economic collapse following
the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
59. See Section IIl.l4, below.
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the extent of the problem, but otherwise the agreement reached errs on
the side of reducing the cost of compliance and in the process weaken-
ing the compliance system.
d. Mechanisms'Eligibility
One cross-cutting issue with respect to the use of the mechanisms was
the question of eligibility. This refers to the question of when and un-
der what circumstances Parties should be permitted to use the three
mechanisms' established in the Kyoto Protocol. This issue is most rel-
evant to the question of reporting and compliance. Use of the mecha-
nisms provides significant reporting and verification challenges on
the one hand. On the other hand, the desire to use the mechanisms is
likely to be a strong motivator to meet any eligibility requirements
imposed, as long as they are proportional to the benefit of being able
to use the mechanisms.
It is not surprising that mechanisms' eligibility was considered by
some to be an effective incentive to ensure that an amendment under
Article 18 with legally binding consequences would be ratified by all
Parties to the Protocol. Having said this, there were a number of addi-
tional motivations for limiting mechanisms' eligibility. Some coun-
tries were simply against the use of the mechanisms, and were arguing
for strict eligibility requirements as a way to minimize their use. For
others, some of the reporting, review and verification procedures were
seen as crucial to ensuring that credits generated or traded under the
mechanisms were legitimate and deserved to be treated on par with
domestic action. Overall the negotiations were over access to the mecha-
nisms on the one hand, and use of eligibility as a motivator to comply
with other requirements under the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech
Accords on the other.
The European Union was generally in favour of strict eligibility
requirements. This is consistent with its approach to implementation
and compliance, which seems to focus on domestic action and the use
of the so-called "bubble" under Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Ar-
ticle 4 will allow the EU to trade within the EU without having to
resort to use of the Kyoto mechanisms. 6' The G-77 and China were
60. Note, however, that the EU includes only one economy in transition, former East Germany. The
Bubble otherwise does not give the EU a compliance advantage over countries like the U.S., given
that both are subject to the same rules for purposes of supplementing action in developed countries
with action in economies in transition and developing countries, which are limited to Joint Imple-
mentation and the Clean Development Mechanism. "Bubble" refers to the process of replacing indi-
vidual country targets with a collective target for all members of the "bubble."
136 The Dalhousie Law Journal
generally in favour of strict eligibility criteria, although for varying
reasons. The UG was generally considered to be most interested in
making use of the mechanisms, and it was clear that access to "hot
air"61 from Russia was part of the compliance strategy for a number of
UG countries.
This included the U.S. when it was still actively engaged, but also
Japan, Australia, and Canada. For these countries a focus of the mecha-
nism eligibility negotiations was whether Hot Air from Russia and
other economies in transition would be freely available. In this con-
text, UG countries were focussed on keeping out of the Marrakech
Accords any conditions for eligibility that Russia might have diffi-
culty meeting or might be unwilling to meet. This included qualitative
reporting requirements on sinks inventories, 62 any link to acceptance
of binding consequences, 63 and the failure of a party to comply with
Commitment Period Reserve requirements. 64
On the other hand, mechanisms' eligibility was seen by many as a
very effective incentive to comply with reporting and procedural re-
quirements of the Kyoto Protocol. This is in part because it provides
an internal compliance incentive, which means that it does not require
an action or sanction outside the Kyoto process. This avoids difficult
enforcement issues and, depending on the definition of binding conse-
quences, provides an effective compliance tool without the require-
ment of an amendment under Article 18.
In the end, only limited use was made of mechanisms' eligibility as
a motivator for Parties to comply with requirements under the Kyoto
Protocol and the Marrakech Accords. In Bonn, Parties had agreed that
in order to be eligible to use the mechanisms, a party has to meet the
following requirements 65 :
61. Hot Air refers to the difference between actual emissions and the assigned amount for econo-
mies in transition, which has resulted in excess credits in those countries generated by economic
collapse rather than emission reduction efforts. For a discussion of Hot Air, see Christine Batruch,
"' Hot Air' as Precedent for Developing Countries? Equity Considerations" (1999) 17 UCLA J. Envtl.
L. & Pol'y 45.
62. See discussion in Sections 111.2 and 111.3, below.
63. See discussion on compliance in Section 111.4, below.
64. For the CPR requirements, see Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Ar-
ticle 17), Annex, para. 6 at 99. See also discussion on CPR in Section 111. L.c, below.
65. These are reflected in the Marrakech Accords, ibid., Draft decision -/CMP.I (Article 17), An-
nex, para. 2 at 98.
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a) It has to be a party to the Kyoto Protocol;
b) It has to have satisfactorily established its assigned amount in
accordance with Articles 3.7, 3.8 and 7.4;
c) It has to have its national system in place for emissions inven-
tories in accordance with Article 5. 1;
d) It has to have its national registry in place in accordance with
Article 7.4.66
The Marrakech Accords incorporate these decisions made in Bonn
and include the following additional decisions on eligibility:
a) Maintenance of the Commitment Period Reserve was decided
not to be an eligibility requirement, meaning that a country
could sell beyond the limits set under the reserve provisions
and still have full access to the mechanisms 67 ;
b) There is a requirement to report on sinks inventories under
Article 3.4 as part of a party's annual reporting requirements,
but this is not a qualitative requirement. This treats sinks re-
porting differently than emissions reporting, for which a party
has to meet qualitative 68 requirements under Articles 5, 7, and
8 in order to retain its eligibility to use the mechanisms69 ;
c) The opportunity to link mechanisms eligibility to acceptance
of an amendment under Article 18 on compliance was lost as
a result of a failure to agree on binding consequences. Russia.
66. For a copy of the political agreement in Bonn, see UNFCCC, Review of the Implementation of
Commitments and of other provisions of the Convention: Preparations for the First Session of the
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/
CP4), UNFCCCOR, 6th Sess., pt. 2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (2001), online: FCCC <http://
www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/107.pdf>.
67. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 17), Annex, para. 2 at 98.
68. Ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 17), Annex, para. 2(e) at 98.
69. See also discussion under Section 1Il.3.b and Sinks, section 111.2, below. In the last moments of
negotiations, Canada was able to include a further amendment on sinks' eligibility under Article 3.4
of The Kyoto Protocol, which results in each category of 3.4 sequestration being treated separately,
which means that failure to meet requirements under Articles 5, 7, and 8 for forest management
disqualifies a party from issuing sinks credits for forest management until the problem has been
resolved, but allows it to issue soil sequestration credits under 3.4, as long as the 5, 7, and 8 require-
ments are met with respect to soil sequestration. This illustrates the approach in the Marrakech
Accords of maximizing access to mechanisms and sinks, and to only limit them when there is a direct
concern about the quality of the credits in question. The opportunity to use eligibility as a motivator
to bring countries into compliance was lost. This is particularly noteworthy and worrisome in light
of the failure to agree on the binding nature of the consequences.
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Australia, and Japan opposed binding consequences and, as a
result, opposed the link because it could have put them in a
position of having to choose between ratifying an amendment
containing binding consequences or losing access to the mecha-
nisms. Solutions proposed for this in the last few days of ne-
gotiations were rejected by the four remaining UG countries,
including Canada. As a result, only acceptance of the compli-
ance procedures, not an amendment on binding consequences,
will be an eligibility requirement 0 ;
d) For Joint Implementation, there is an exemption for the re-
quirement to meet reporting criteria in case of project-based
Joint Implementation projects. In other words, if a host coun-
try can meet the reporting requirements for its emissions' in-
ventories, assigned amounts, etc., it will be eligible under Track
One of Joint Implementation. If it cannot meet those eligibil-
ity requirements, it can still take part in Joint Implementation,
but only under Track Two. The basic difference between the
two tracks is that the First Track is more like Emissions Trad-
ing, whereas Track Two is more like the Clean Development
Mechanism. 7'
In summary, some use was made of eligibility to the mechanisms
to improve compliance with monitoring, reporting, and verification
procedures. Given the limited use made of this for compliance pur-
poses, overall this must be considered an opportunity lost. Eligibility
was the main cross-cutting issue on the mechanisms addressed in
Marrakech. A few others are covered under Articles 5, 7, and 8 below.
2. Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (Sinks)
72
The issue of sinks is relevant to all three questions posed in this article.
Given the temporary nature of sink storage, and the challenges involved in
accurately estimating the contribution of sinks to reducing GHG concen-
70. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Decision -/CP.7 (Mechanisms) at 51; ibid., Draft decision
-/CMP.1 (Mechanisms) at 52.
71. See also Joint Implementation, Section Ill. Lb, below. This again demonstrates the focus on
ensuring the quality of the specific credits generated as the objective of eligibility criteria, not the
use of eligibility as a motivator for compliance.
72. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Decision -/CP 7 (Land use, land use change and forestry)
at 118; ibid., Draft decision -/CMP I (Land use, land use change and forestry) at 120.
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trations in the atmosphere, the rules for the use of sinks have a critical role
to play in understanding the environmental impact of the Protocol. Moni-
toring, reporting, and verification present a major challenge for sinks. So
does the influence of nature, such as forest fires just before the end of a
commitment period. They increase the chance of a party being out of com-
pliance as a result of an unforeseen event, in spite of careful planning and
implementation.
Sinks are an issue under the Kyoto Protocol in three contexts:
* Article 3.3 with respect to land use changes in the context of forests;
* Article 3.4 with respect to additional human induced activities re-
lated to land use, land use change and forestry, and
* The use of sinks under the Clean Development Mechanism.
The issue of sinks has been a controversial one ever since their inclu-
sion in the Protocol.73 It is worthwhile at the outset to establish exactly
what the relevant provisions of the Protocol provide.
Article 3.3, as a starting point, is fairly limited in scope. It requires the
inclusion of net changes in carbon stock in Annex I countries compared to
1990 as a result of afforestation, reforestation and deforestation to be in-
cluded in the accounting of a party's emissions for purposes of meeting its
emissions reduction target. Article 3.3 is limited to land use changes for
forests, and is further limited to direct human-induced changes, excluding
natural afforestation, deforestation and reforestation. Furthermore, what is
accounted for under Article 3.3 is the change in carbon stock during the
commitment period as a result of the land use change, not the total change
in carbon stock since 1990 (the base year for identifying what land use
changes have occurred). Essentially, Article 3.3 creates an incentive for
Annex I countries to maximize the forest cover within their jurisdictions.
The most controversial issue with respect to Article 3.3 has been where
to draw the line between reforestation on the one hand, and deforestation
and afforestation on the other. In the end, the Parties agreed to a definition
of afforestation as the forestation of any land that has not been forested for
at least 50 years, reforestation as the forestation of land that was not for-
ested on 31 December 1989, and deforestation as the conversion of forests
to non-forested land.74 Other difficult issues included the definition of a
73. Supra note 1.
74. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP.I (Land use, land use change and
forestry), Annex, Part A at 122.
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forest,75 and the role of harvesting in the accounting of carbon stock.76 This
is relevant because of the reference in the definition of deforestation to the
conversion of land to non-forested land. Harvesting with either natural or
human-induced regrowth would not meet that definition. It is left to Par-
ties to report on how harvesting is distinguished from deforestation. In the
end, while there were fundamental disagreements over whether or not sinks
should be used by Parties to meet their emission reduction targets, there
was general recognition that this issue had been included under Article 3.3
in Kyoto. As a result, the remaining issues were resolved relatively easily.
Article 3.4 has been much more problematic and controversial. It es-
sentially provides an opportunity for Annex I Parties to claim credits for
removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere through means other than
land use change in the context of forests. In practice this can include forest
management activities, and the sequestration of carbon through other means
such as in soils, among others.
There were a number of fundamental issues which made negotia-
tions on this provision difficult to say the least. First, given that there was
no clear expectation by the Parties as to whether and to what extent they
would be able to make use of this provision, it is reasonable to assume that
Article 3.4 was not a major factor in the negotiation of countries' targets
under the Protocol. If this was the case, it raises the possibility of a coun-
try essentially getting an economic windfall relative to other Parties, if it
turns out that the rules agreed to for Article 3.4 provide it with a cheap
alternative to meet a major portion of its commitment. In other words, use
of Article 3.4 could and was seen by countries who could not take advan-
tage of this provision as an attempt by countries with large land mass to
renegotiate their targets. For some countries, Article 3.4 had the potential
to cover more than half the gap between the country's Kyoto target and
business as usual.
77
Secondly, one of the objectives of the Protocol was that it should
achieve an overall reduction of emissions of at least 5% in Annex I coun-
tries. If a major effort were to be put into activities under Article 3.4, this
collective obligation would no longer be met.
Thirdly, sinks carry with them the inherent difficulty of their lack of
permanence. Should sequestration be treated on par with emission reduc-
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Land use, land use change and forestry), Annex, Part B at
123.
77. For a good overview of the issues related to sinks, see Chris Rolfe, Sink Solution (2001), online:
West Coast Environmental Law Association <http://www.wcel.org/wcelpub/200 1/13458.pdf>.
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tion, knowing that any credit claimed by a party now will turn into a debit
at some point in the future, and most likely become an issue in the negotia-
tion of future commitment period targets? Should Parties be permitted to
essentially borrow from future commitment periods in the interest of mini-
mizing the cost of meeting the first commitment period target, thereby
enticing countries to ratify?
The response to all these questions from two of the three major negoti-
ating blocks was "no" for most of the negotiations. The EU and the G-77
were opposed to allowing any additional sequestration activities under
Article 3.4 for the first commitment period. This was one of the reasons,
perhaps the main reason, why negotiations failed in The Hague. The change
in position by the EU on this issue between The Hague and Bonn was also
the main reason why the political agreement was reached in Bonn, and
why it was possible to finalize the implementation of the Buenos Aires
Plan ofAction in Marrakech. As a result, there are generous provisions in
the Marrakech Accords allowing for use of Article 3.4 that clearly goes
beyond what was contemplated, or at least agreed to, in Kyoto.
As a starting point, Parties are permitted to use the following activities
to generate credits under Article 3.4: revegetation, forest management, crop-
land management, and grazing land management.78 Of these, forest man-
agement has been the most controversial, in part because it is generally
recognized to have the greatest sequestration potential, and because of dif-
ficulty in separating natural sequestration from sequestration induced by
human forest management activity. In the end, Parties agreed to country by
country caps on the amount of credits a party can generate from forest
management under Article 3.4.79 The numbers are loosely based on an 85%
discount factor,0 and a 3% cap on forest management activities, meaning a
country may be able to increase its assigned amount by up to 3% based on
forest management alone.
Other sinks activities under Article 3.4 are not affected by this cap,
and can be used to the extent that a party is able to demonstrate anthropo-
genic sequestration. Any land accounted for under Article 3.4 becomes
78. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Land use, and use change and
forestry), Annex, Part C at 123.
79. See Marrakech Accords, ibid, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Land use, land-use change and forestry)
Annex, Appendix at 126; and ibid., Decision -/CP.7 (Forest management activities under Article 3.4
of the Kyoto Protocol: the Russian Federation) at 127, which increases the Russian cap from 17 to 33
megatons.
80. The discount factor is intended to ensure that removals other than from anthropogenic forest
management are not counted. Such natural removals include removals resulting from elevated car-
bon dioxide levels, indirect nitrogen deposition, and the dynamic effects of the age structure result-
ing from activities prior to the reference year.
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part of the permanent inventory of the party, which means that all future
anthropogenic emissions by source and removals by sinks are accounted
for in future commitment periods. This presumably means that any carbon
stored in these forests as a result of human activity will become an emis-
sion in case of fire or any other activity resulting in their release back into
the atmosphere, whether or not the release itself is caused by human inter-
ference. A country, of course, has the option not to designate any or all of
its forested land for forest management, and thereby avoid both the obliga-
tion to account for changes in carbon stock for existing forests, and the
risk of future debts in case of forest fires or other natural disasters leading
to release of the carbon stored.
Another major concession to UG countries, which are most interested
in using Article 3.4, was the full separation of the various activities permit-
ted. If a party cannot meet the inventory requirements to be able to issue
forest management credits, it can, for example, still issue cropland man-
agement credits, as long as it meets the inventory requirements for crop-
land management. At the heart of this issue was whether the reporting
requirements and standards for sinks reporting are only put in place to
ensure that the particular credits claimed can be and are verified, or whether
these requirements for eligibility to claim sinks credits also operate as an
enforcement tool to encourage Parties to comply with reporting and other
obligations generally in the Protocol. The issue of qualitative annual sinks
reporting as an eligibility requirement for the use of the mechanisms is
another example of this. UG countries took the position that as long as a
country had to meet sinks reporting requirements before issuing sinks cred-
its, the integrity of the Protocol was preserved. Others argued that extend-
ing the effect of failing to report properly on sinks inventories to mecha-
nisms' eligibility was an effective means to encouraging compliance with
sinks reporting requirements, and would avoid difficulties at the end of the
commitment period, when the stakes are likely to be much higher because
the options for making up discrepancies will be limited and are not likely
to be attractive. 8 As discussed under Articles 5, 7, and 8 below, there are
no qualitative eligibility requirements on sinks reporting for the first com-
mitment period in the Marrakech Accords.
Finally, in the context of the Clean Development Mechanisms, the is-
81. It can generally be expected that the price of carbon credits will increase toward the end of the
commitment period, as some Parties struggle to come into compliance. Even if that is not the case,
the ability to bank credits will ensure an increase in the price, as long as the second commitment
period target is considered to be a challenge for Parties.
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sue of whether sinks projects would qualify for credits had to be deter-
mined. On the face, it might have seemed that sinks projects were ex-
cluded under Article 12, given its reference to emission reductions only.
Article 6, for comparison, made specific reference to removal by sinks as
eligible for credits under Joint Implementation. Nevertheless, Parties agreed
that there could be limited use of sinks under the Clean Development
Mechanism. Pressure to allow for this came from Annex I countries that
saw this as a low-cost opportunity to meet their emission reduction targets,
and a number of Latin-American countries who saw this as an opportunity
to receive funding for reforestation projects in their countries.
The main challenge with sinks projects under the CDM relate to imper-
manence, which refers to the fact that all natural sinks eventually re-re-
lease the carbon stored back into the atmosphere. In case of sinks in coun-
tries that have an emissions reduction target, this problem is addressed by
requiring the country to add those emissions into its emissions inventory
when the carbon credited is re-released. In the context of the CDM, how-
ever, this is not possible, given that the host countries currently do not have
emission reduction targets or assigned amounts. These and other outstand-
ing issues on sinks in the CDM could not be resolved in Marrakech, but
were finally resolved at the 9th Conference of the Parties in Milan, Italy in
December, 2003, by attaching liability for the credits to the Party that uses
the credits for compliance purposes. One issue decided in Marrakech was
that sinks projects would be limited to afforestation and reforestation dur-
ing the first commitment period, and that no Annex I country could claim
credits from such projects in excess of 1% of its assigned amount.
In conclusion, it is difficult to see how sinks will play a constructive
part in any long term regime to address climate change, given the chal-
lenges involved. It is difficult to see significant net benefits, either from an
environmental or an equity perspective. At the same time, sinks are likely
to generate incredible monitoring, reporting, verification and compliance
challenges. Matters such as the temporary nature of sinks storage, the loss
of other benefits of reductions, the difficulties in separating natural from
anthropogenic carbon storage, and the long term cost of accounting for the
carbon stored all serve to make this a diversion from the overall objectives
of the UNFCCC. Moreover, whatever the value of sinks in achieving the
objectives of Kyoto and the UNFCCC, the way they were negotiated, as an
alternative, rather than an addition to emission reductions, means sinks
have watered down the ability of Kyoto to meet the objectives of the
UNFCCC.
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3. Reporting and Review (Articles 5, 7, and 8)
In this section, the second question raised at the beginning, the effective-
ness of the monitoring, reporting and verification procedures, will be con-
sidered in some detail. Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the Kyoto Protocol are de-
signed to ensure that decisions about compliance and the use of the mecha-
nisms are based on accurate, reliable, and consistent information from all
member Parties. To this end, Article 5 requires Annex 1 Parties to put in
place a system for national emissions estimations on an annual basis in
accordance with agreed upon methodologies. Article 5 allows for adjust-
ments to be made to the emissions estimation if the methodologies are not
followed. Article 7 then proceeds to require Parties to use those national
systems to report annually on emissions by source and removal by sink,
again, in accordance with agreed upon methodologies. Article 8 finally
provides for review, verification and adjustment of the information pro-
vided by expert review teams to ensure that Parties' annual reporting on
emissions and sinks is accurate, consistent, and complies with the agreed
upon methodologies.
The negotiations under Articles 5, 7, and 8 introduced a number of new
terms to the vocabulary of the participants. Other key terms were taken
from provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. The following are some key terms
used in the Marrakech Accords in this context. In addition to CER's,
82
ERU's83 and AAU's,14 which were introduced in the Kyoto Protocol, the
Marrakech Accords introduced the concept of a Removal Unit (RMU).85
This refers to a credit generated through sinks activity under Articles 3.3
and 3.4.
Once credits are generated, a number of different things can happen to
them. Terminology to describe these different options has evolved to de-
scribe processes other than the obvious one of trading or transferring cred-
its. Issuing of credits refers to the first step, the process of verifying and
certifying credits. In other words, issuing credits refers to the process of
bringing credits into existence. The process of cancelling credits refers to
the opposite process, whereby credits are essentially taken out of circula-
82. Certified Emission Reductions, generated underArticle 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. See Marrakech
Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 12), Annex, para. I at 73.
83. Emission Reduction Units, generated under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, see Marrakech
Accords, ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 6), Annex, para. I at 56.
84. Assigned Amount Units, assigned to Parties based on their assigned targets, see Marrakech
Accords, ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I (Article 17), Annex, para. I at 98.
85. See Marrakech Accords, ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. I Modalities for the accounting of assigned
amounts under Article 7, para. 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex, paras. 4, 11 at 103, 105.
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tion without being used to meet a country's commitments. This could be
done, for example, if a party wished to pay the price of emission credits
not for investment purposes or for purposes of compliance, but to prevent
emissions beyond the reductions required under the Kyoto Protocol. There
are other isolated incidents where Parties may be required to cancel credits.
Most credits are expected to be retired by one party or another at the
end of the commitment period. Retirement of credits refers to the process
of using credits to offset emissions during the commitment period. One
other option for Parties is to hold certain credits to meet subsequent com-
mitment period targets rather than use up or trade the credit in the commit-
ment period in which it was generated. This option is referred to as bank-
ing credits or carry over of credits. One final term of note is the recycling
or laundering of credits. These terms are used interchangeably depending
on whether the person using the term approves or disapproves of the pro-
cess. Recycling and laundering refers to the process of purchasing one
type of credit with restrictions attached to it, such as an RMU that cannot
be banked, and switching the credit purchased for an AAU or other unre-
stricted credit held by the party, so that the AAU is banked and the RMU is
retired for compliance purposes, rather than the AAU originally held for
that purpose.
Much of the work done by the negotiating group on these three articles
was technical and not controversial. There were, in the end, however, a
number of key issues that had major implications for the use of the mecha-
nisms and sinks as well as for the operation of the compliance system.
Key issues in the negotiations included:
a) accounting of assigned amount under Article 7.4;
b) annual reporting on sinks;
c) reporting and review of Article 3.14 information;
d) composition of Expert Review Teams;
e) relationship between the power of the Expert Review Teams
to make conservative adjustments and compliance issues.
a. Modalities For The Accounting OfAssignedA mount, Article 7.4
There is a direct link between the challenges in the negotiations over
the modalities for the assigned amount under Article 7.4, and the dif-
ferent views of Parties over the role of the mechanisms. It became
clear in the course of the negotiations that the G-77 on the one hand
and the Umbrella Group on the other hand, developed very different
visions of how the mechanisms would be and should be used by Parties.
For the G-77, whatever credits were generated under any of the
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mechanisms would be held either by the host or the funding country
until the end of the commitment period, and would be traded at that
time between Parties depending on which Annex I countries had been
able to meet their targets through domestic action and the use of project-
based mechanisms. In other words, trading would take place among
Parties at the very end to financially reward those who exceeded their
target and punish those who were unable to meet their target without
trading. In the meantime, the purpose of the mechanisms was to gen-
erate credits as between the host and funding country, not to trade them.
The Umbrella Group, on the other hand, had developed a market-
based vision of how the mechanisms would operate, with assigned
amounts and credits generated under the mechanisms traded on the
stock market, with credits generated mainly by private entities, and
with as few restrictions on trading as possible.86 The objective would
be for countries to be able to determine based on the price of carbon
on the stock market, what the limit of expenditure per ton of carbon
should be for domestic action. In other words, the UG wanted to be
able to look to the stock market for guidance on what level of domestic
effort would be cost effective in a country's effort to meet its emission
reduction target.
These two very different visions on how the mechanisms would
operate remained until the last few days of negotiations in Marrakech,
and created ongoing challenges in resolving much of the detail on how
to operationalize the Kyoto mechanisms. The way this impacted on the
negotiations on Articles 5, 7, and 8 and, in particular, the modalities
for accounting of assigned amount under Article 7.4 was as follows.
The G-77 saw the assigned amount as fixed, and wanted to keep CER's
ERU's and RMU's separate from each other and from the assigned
amount for the duration of the commitment period. The UG, on the
other hand, saw CER's, ERU's and RMU's as essentially freely added to
and subtracted from the assigned amount, making credits generated
indistinguishable from credits assigned to Parties at the outset as part
of their assigned amounts. In the end, as discussed above under mecha-
nisms, this issue was resolved in favour of the UG, with some sym-
bolic safeguards put in place.87
86. For a discussion of the role of private entities, see Jean Acquatella, Private Finance and Invest-
ment Issues in GHG Offset Projects (Geneva: International Academy of the Environment, 1998).
87. See discussion on fungibility, under Kyoto Mechanisms, Emissions Trading, Section llI.l.d.i,
above.
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b. Annual Reporting On Sinks Activity Under Articles 3.3 And 3.4
There is a clear requirement under Article 7 for Annex I Parties to
include in their annual inventories and their annual reporting informa-
tion on removal of greenhouse gases by sinks. The issues left to be
determined were whether there would be a qualitative requirement
similar to emissions inventories, and whether there would be a link to
eligibility to use the mechanisms. It is important to note that the pro-
cess of reporting annually on removal by sinks is separate from the
process of verifying credits for removal of greenhouse gases through
the use of sinks in accordance with Articles 3.3 and 3.4 and the result-
ing issuance of RMU's. The purpose of requiring the reporting on sinks
activities annually under Article 7 is to be able to better identify prob-
lems either with a country's ability to verify sinks credits or more gen-
erally, whether a country's overall compliance strategy, including its
reliance on sinks, is likely to result in overall compliance with its tar-
get. This is particularly important in the context of uncertainty over
legally binding consequences, based on the assumption that the less
ability you have to motivate compliance through the imposition of con-
sequences, the more important it is for the overall compliance system
to be able to identify problems early and work with Parties to address
problem areas.
In the end, another opportunity to develop an effective internal com-
pliance mechanism that would improve the likelihood of compliance,
either in the absence of or without having to resort to binding conse-
quences, was lost. While there is a link between mechanisms eligibil-
ity and the requirement to report annually on sinks, there is no link to
any qualitative requirement for reporting on sinks. This means an in-
centive to report something, but not to report in a manner consistent
with what will be required when a party seeks to have its sinks credits
certified to enable it to issue RMU's for trading or compliance. That
means there is less ability of the compliance system to catch sinks
inventory problems early, and prevent compliance problems at the end
of the compliance period, when choices for addressing non-compli-
ance are limited and generally not likely to be attractive.
While there was no link between the quality of reporting on sinks
and eligibility, Parties did agree on some qualitative requirements for
reporting. They include a requirement to report on geographic loca-
tion of the boundaries for each unit of land subject to Articles 3.3 and
3.4. The purpose of this requirement is at least twofold, to allow land
that a country chooses to include in its sinks inventory to be tracked
over time, and to allow for the monitoring of biodiversity impacts of
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measures to improve the sink capacity of these lands. Reporting to
demonstrate that the activities under Article 3.4 are human-induced
was also included in the qualitative requirements, as was reporting on
Parties' legislative efforts to address biodiversity concerns.88
c. Reporting and Review ofArticle 3.14 Information
Article 3.14 requires Parties to strive to implement their commitments
in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and eco-
nomic impacts on developing country Parties. The nature of this obli-
gation was a contentious issue during the course of the negotiations,
mainly due to pressure from OPEC countries, who consider this to
require Annex I countries to take measures to minimize impacts on
their economies. Given that the economies of OPEC countries are
heavily reliant on the production and export of fossil fuels, OPEC coun-
tries took the position that Article 3.14 requires Annex I countries to
take measures to ensure that reductions in consumption of fossil fuels
are achieved in line with reductions in production within Annex I coun-
tries, so as to minimize any impact on the economies of OPEC coun-
tries. OPEC countries were looking for a number of ways to turn Ar-
ticle 3.14 into an enforceable obligation. One such attempt was to in-
clude qualitative reporting requirements on efforts to comply with this
Article, and to make compliance with those reporting requirements an
eligibility requirement for the use of the mechanisms.
There was no overall agreement in Marrakech on what Article 3.14
substantively requires. With respect to reporting, Parties do have to
report annually, but there are few qualitative criteria,89 and reporting is
not an eligibility requirement. Parties are required to report on efforts
to phase out domestic subsidies for fossil fuel production, to assist in
the development of non-energy uses of fossil fuels, and to assist devel-
oping countries in making the transition away from production of fos-
sil fuels for energy purposes. Article 3.14 compliance issues can only
be referred to the facilitative branch. There are, therefore, no conse-
quences attached to non-compliance with Article 3.14.
88. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Draft decision -/CMP. I Land use, land-use change and
forestry, Annex, Part E at 125; and ibid., Draft decision -/CMP.1 Guidelines for the Preparation of
the Information Required under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex, Part D at 159.
89. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP.I Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required
under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex, Part H at 126.
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d. Composition of Expert Review Teams9"
Composition of the Expert Review Teams was a long-standing issue,
similar in nature to other disputes over composition of bodies to be
established for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. What made
negotiations on the Expert Review Teams somewhat different was the
level of expertise required to carry out the function on the one hand,
and the serious implication of the work of the Expert Review Teams
on the other. This process of reviewing the information provided by
Parties on their compliance with various obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol is at the core of the compliance regime, and at the core of the
implementation of the Protocol. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the composition of the teams was particularly controversial. Positions
on the selection of experts for these review teams ranged from
geographical representation and essentially political appointments to
representation from Annex I countries only, with appointment based
on expertise.
In the end, the Marrakech Accords include some provision to limit
the potential for the process to be politicized, and place the onus on the
Secretariat to select experts to a specific review team in a manner that
ensures fairness and geographical balance. The roster from which the
secretariat will select team members can be nominated by Parties. The
selection process is left to be decided by the Parties collectively through
the COP/MOP.
e. Conservative Adjustments and Compliance9'
The issue here relates to the power of Expert Review Teams to make
conservative adjustments to national inventories submitted if those in-
ventories do not comply with the methodologies developed, or in case
of gaps in reporting. Conservative adjustment in this context refers to
the process of estimating a country's emissions, if the information pro-
vided is incorrect or incomplete. This measure was put in place due to
the vital importance of access to a consistent and accurate estimation
of emissions. The annual emissions of Parties during the commitment
period provide the foundation for determining compliance, or what
90. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMP. 1 Guidelines for Review Under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol,
Annex, Part E at 173.
91. For the decision that adjustments to emissions inventories shall be conservative, see
ibid., Draft decision -/CMP I Good practice guidance and adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2,
of the Kyoto Protocol, para. 5 at 162.
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amount of a combination of assigned amount and credits a party has to
have in its possession at the end of the commitment period in order to
be found to be in compliance with its target.
The conservative adjustment power serves two purposes, to en-
courage Parties to provide complete information in accordance with
the methodologies developed so that all Parties are evaluated equally,
and to resolve problems with reporting in a manner that ensures gaps
in information are resolved in favour of protecting the integrity of the
targets set. This is crucial because an accurate assessment of a country's
emissions is only possible with the full cooperation of the party and,
even then, emissions can only be estimated. It is practically impossible
to determine accurately actual emissions given their diverse sources.
One controversial issue in the negotiations was what to do when
the conservative adjustment in itself was not a sufficient response to a
party's failure to comply with its reporting requirements on its annual
emissions. This was resolved by providing as an additional enforce-
ment measure the loss of eligibility to use the mechanisms, when the
difference between what Parties were reporting and the adjustments
made, exceeded certain limits. The limits imposed were a 7% differ-
ence in a single year, or a cumulative difference of more than 20%.92
The reporting and verification procedures are on the whole, quite
strong. Consistent with negotiations dealing with trading generally,
however, the process errs on the side of producing an efficient trading
system over one that maximizes the environmental and equity benefits
of the actions taken to comply with the Kyoto obligations. Significant
future adjustments must be considered to protect the environmental
and equity objectives of the UNFCCC if the cost of carbon on the in-
ternational market becomes a significant driver for a Party's policy
decisions on how to meet their Kyoto obligations.
4. Compliance93
It has been clear since the early days of negotiations under the UNFCCC
that the stakes are high under the Kyoto Protocol, and efforts by individual
92. See ibid., Draft decision -/CMPI Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required
under Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol, para. 3 at 157.
93. For a general discussion of compliance issues in the context of climate change, see Peggy Rodgers
Kalas & Alexia Herwig, "Dispute Resolution under the Kyoto Protocol" (2000) 27 Ecology L.Q. 53;
David G. Victor, "Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global Warming Re-
gime" (1999) 10 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 147; Jutta Brunn6e, "A Fine Balance: Facilitation and
Enforcement in the Design of a Compliance for the Kyoto Protocol" (2000) 13 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 223.
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Parties can be expected to depend on their assessment of the likelihood
that other Parties will comply. In fact, many countries are perceived to
consider the Kyoto Protocol as much an economic agreement as an envi-
ronmental one. Given the economic implications, and the importance of
equitable burden sharing, a strong compliance system is therefore crucial
to this agreement.
The heavy reliance on flexible market mechanisms places the Protocol
in a unique position on compliance, at least as compared to other environ-
mental agreements.94 Compliance systems with effective enforcement tools
are rare in international law, and almost nonexistent in the context of Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements. To make matters more difficult, the
Kyoto Protocol includes a provision, in Article 18, which requires any bind-
ing consequences to be adopted by way of amendment. This essentially
prevents any party from being subject to binding consequences as a pre-
condition for ratifying the Protocol, given that the amendment can only be
put forward once the Protocol has come into force, and that Parties will be
able to decide whether to ratify any amendment independent of the deci-
sion to join the Protocol. At the same time, the economic stakes are con-
sidered to be high,95 and much of the disagreement over interpretation and
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol has been about the effort to be made
by one country relative to another.
In this context, an effective compliance regime is likely to be essential
as it will give each party the assurance that other countries will do their
part or face consequences that will retain or restore the economic balance
the Parties are so concerned about. Some of the Parties most concerned
about the economic impact of compliance with their obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol were also most strongly opposed to binding consequences,
suggesting that non-compliance may be an option contemplated by those
countries in case the economic burden of meeting their obligations was
considered to be too high.96 In spite of its limitations, and probably be-
94. See Donald M. Goldberg et al., Responsibility for Non-Compliance Under the Kyoto Protocols
Mechanisms for Cooperative Implementation (Washington, D.C.: The Centre for International Envi-
ronmental Law and Euronatura-Centre for Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, 1998),
online: CIEL <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/pubccp.html>.
95. While this assessment may still be accurate for domestic action, the price of international cred-
its to supplement domestic action is generally considered to be much lower as a result of the U.S.
pull-out. For a post-Marrakech analysis of the international price of carbon, see the Point Carbon
Price Forecasting website: <http://www.pointcarbon.com/article.php?articlelD= 1648>.
96. Australia, Japan, and Russia remained opposed to binding consequences throughout the nego-
tiations. Canada formally accepted the concept of binding consequences late in the process, but
supported those opposed in their efforts to prevent a decision on this issue before the first meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Of interest is that before it pulled out of the negotiations in the
winter of 2001, the U.S. was a strong supporter of binding consequences.
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cause of the high economic stakes, the compliance system developed un-
der the Marrakech Accords promises to be by far the most effective com-
pliance regime under any Multilateral Environmental Agreement.97 The
negotiation process itself, the ultimate enforcement tool of restoration of
tons in the next commitment period with a penalty rate and a compliance
action plan, as well as the fact that the next commitment period targets
have not yet been negotiated, are all factors that can enhance the integrity
of the compliance system by providing mechanisms for compliance on the
one hand and affording opportunities to address any apparent inequities in
the allocation of the burden to date on the other.
The focal point of the compliance system is the obligation of Annex I
countries under Article 3.1 to meet their emissions reduction target in ac-
cordance with the rules and procedures agreed to in Marrakech. There are,
however, numerous other obligations in the Kyoto Protocol. These com-
mitments fall into two categories: obligations necessary to verify that a
country has met its emissions reduction target, and obligations not essen-
tial to that process. Reporting obligations under Articles 5, 7, and 8 of the
Kyoto Protocol clearly fall into the first category. Without the information
required under those provisions, it is simply not possible to determine
whether a country has complied with its national emissions reduction ob-
ligation under Article 3.1.
Obligations under Articles 10 and 11 of the Kyoto Protocol with re-
spect to assistance to developing countries in the form of financial aid,
capacity building, and technology transfer clearly fall into the second cat-
egory. In addition, there are a number of obligations that fall into a grey
area, in that they have some link to the emissions reduction targets, but
there were very divergent views among the Parties on how relevant that
link was. This, in turn, had implications for how these obligations were
treated in the compliance system. These grey area obligations include the
following:
* Article 3.1, reference to the goal of reducing overall emissions of
Annex B countries by at least 5% below 1990 levels;
" Article 3.2, obligation to make demonstrable progress by 2005;
" Article 3.14, obligation to implement commitments in such a way
97. See JeffTrask, "Montreal Protocol Noncompliance Procedure: The Best Approach to Resolving
International Environmental Disputes?" (1992) 80 Geo. L. J. 1973; DeSombre, supra note 10; Eliza-
beth P. Barratt-Brown, "Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime under the Montreal Proto-
col" (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 519. See also Brunnee, supra note 93.
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as to minimize adverse social, environmental, and economic im-
pacts on developing countries;
" Articles 6(d), 17, obligation that use of mechanisms are to be supple-
mental to domestic action;
" Article 2, obligation to cooperate in the development and imple-
mentation of policies and measures to enhance their individual
and combined effect.
Against this backdrop, we can now consider the actual compliance sys-
tem established in Marrakech." The Marrakech Accords set up a compli-
ance committee that will function in the form of a plenary, a bureau, and
two branches, one for the purpose of facilitating countries efforts to com-
ply with obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, and the other to enforce
compliance with specific obligations. The bureau, as well as the two
branches, will select its members from the overall compliance committee.
The composition of the overall compliance committee is determined by
the composition of the facilitative and enforcement branches. Each branch
is composed of one member from each of the five regional groups of the
United Nations, one member representing small island states, and two
members each from Annex I countries and Non-Annex I countries. While
this was relatively uncontroversial for the facilitative branch, composition
of the enforcement branch was one of the last issues resolved, due to a
reluctance of Annex I countries to be judged by a majority of Non-Annex
I members of the branch. Decisions are to be made by consensus whenever
possible. In case consensus is not possible, a majority of three-quarters is
required for any decision of the committee or one of its branches.
The plenary is responsible for the reporting to the COP, and for the
overall administration of the compliance process. The bureau serves the
function of receiving and reviewing questions of implementation brought
to the compliance committee and determines which branch of the compli-
ance committee is responsible for responding to the issue raised. The fa-
cilitative branch is generally responsible for assisting Parties in their ef-
forts to meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This includes pro-
viding advice, and otherwise facilitating compliance with respect to com-
mitments under Articles 3.1, 5.1, and 5.2, and 7.1, and 7.4. With respect to
these provisions, the mandate of the facilitative branch overlaps with that
of the enforcement branch, which has a mandate to determine compliance
98. See Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance
under the Kyoto Protocol, Decision -/CP.7 (including the Annex) at 128.
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and impose consequences of non-compliance with these provisions. In
addition to providing advice on Articles 3.1, 5, and 7, the facilitative branch
has the exclusive mandate to address questions of implementation with
respect to supplementarity under Articles 6, 12, and 17, Article 3.14 deal-
ing with effects of mitigation measures on developing countries, and re-
porting on demonstrable progress under Article 3.2.
Overall, therefore, the jurisdiction of the enforcement branch was lim-
ited to provisions that had a clearly accepted link to the emissions reduc-
tion target under Article 3.1. All other obligations were in the end agreed to
be subject to facilitation only, not subject to enforcement. Decisions of the
enforcement branch regarding compliance with Article 3.1 will generally
follow the review of the final reports submitted by a party under Article 8
at the end of the commitment period, which is expected to be concluded
about 15 months after the end of the commitment period. Before a deter-
mination of noncompliance is made at this point, Parties are provided with
an opportunity to come into compliance by purchasing the necessary cred-
its from another party. Under Part XIII of the compliance annex, a party
may buy credits for compliance purposes up to 100 days after the expert
review process for the commitment period under Article 8 is declared by
the conference of the Parties to be concluded.9 9
The importance of the distinction between the two branches becomes
clear when one compares the consequences applied by each of the branches.
The facilitative branch, under part XIV of the Annex on compliance, can
apply the following consequences:
* Provision of advice and facilitation of assistance;
* Facilitation of financial and technical assistance, including tech-
nology transfer and capacity building;
* Formulation of recommendations to a party on what could be done
to address concerns about a party's ability to comply with its obli-
gations. 100
99. Ibid., Part XIII, Additional Period for Fulfilling Commitments at 138.
100. Ibid., Part XIV, Consequences Applied by the Facilitative Branch at 138.
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The enforcement branch has the power to apply the following consequences:
* Declaration of noncompliance;
" Require a party to submit a compliance action plan, which would
include an analysis of the causes of non-compliance, measures to
be taken to return to compliance, and a timetable for implement-
ing the measures;
" Suspension of eligibility to use the mechanisms, if a party is found
not to meet one of the eligibility requirements;
* In case of failure to meet its emissions reduction target under Ar-
ticle 3.1, the branch shall deduct from the party's assigned amount
for the second commitment period 1.3 times the amount of excess
emissions from the first commitment period.'0'
The substantive penalty for not meeting the first commitment period
target therefore is a reduction of the assigned amount in the second com-
mitment period with a multiplier or penalty rate) 2 The question of what to
do at this stage of the process was the subject of considerable disagree-
ment during the negotiations. The challenge from a compliance perspec-
tive is that by 2012, it will be too late to actually reduce emissions during
the commitment period, either through domestic or international action. A
party that has not been able to gather enough credits to offset its emissions
has few options left at this point, and no control over whether they are
available. The general options left at this stage are to require the party to
restore the reductions in the second commitment period, to impose a pen-
alty, or both.
The compliance challenge at the end of a commitment period, on the
one hand, highlights the important role of the facilitative branch to iden-
tify these concerns early enough be able to assist a country to avoid non-
compliance at the end of the commitment period. On the other hand,
recognising that the facilitative process is not likely to prevent non-com-
pliance in all cases, 13 it raises the question of how to effectively respond at
101. Ibid., Part XV, Consequences Applied by the Enforcement Branch at 139.
102. Also referred to as borrowing or restoration.
103. Especially considering the uncertainty introduced through the expanded use of sinks. Parties
are not required to do qualitative reporting until they try to issue sinks credits. This could mean
considerable differences between a party's expectation and credits issued. In addition, any area
included under Articles 3.3 or 3.4 could lose its sinks credits in the case of a forest fire. This means
considerable uncertainty over the amount of sinks credits a party will have at the end of a commit-
ment period. As a result, a party could be out of compliance in spite of reasonable efforts to meet its
target. Similar uncertainties would be introduced ifa party decided to purchase credits from a party
that was not complying with its commitment period reserve requirement, as it might again not know
early enough whether those credits will be available for compliance purposes.
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this stage. If other Parties have exceeded their targets, the noncomplying
party will be able to use emissions trading as a means to come into compli-
ance. Without the U.S., and given the amount of "Hot Air" and sinks cred-
its expected to be available from Russia and Ukraine, it is likely that this
will be sufficient to allow countries to come onto compliance. With the
U.S. included, or in case other unforeseen events cause international cred-
its to be unavailable, 04 some other means of restoring the balance and
motivating compliance had to be found.
There were two options considered in the early stages of negotiations,
the restoration rate included in the Marrakech Accords, and a compliance
fund. The compliance fund would have required payment rather than can-
cellation of assigned amounts in the next commitment period.0 5 The com-
pliance fund concept was eventually dropped over disagreement on how to
ensure that the funds collected would be spent in such a way as to ensure
the environmental harm of noncompliance would be undone. This debate
centred on who would administer the fund, whether the funds would be
spent domestically or internationally, whether payment into the fund would
be voluntary or mandatory, and whether there would be a limit to the price
to be paid per ton, or whether it would be linked to the price of carbon at
the end of the commitment period with a multiplier. These issues could not
be resolved in The Hague. The compliance fund was eliminated as an op-
tion at that stage, and did not resurface in Bonn or Marrakech.
The general process in the compliance system is that a question is
brought to the bureau for a determination of which branch has jurisdiction.
There are three ways issues can come before the compliance committee:
as a result of a review of a country's submissions by an expert review team
under Articles 5 and 7, at the initiative of a party that realizes it requires
assistance in meeting one of its obligations, or at the request of another
party that questions compliance of a party with one of its obligations. 0 6 In
cases of issues over which both branches have jurisdiction, such as report-
ing obligations under Articles 5 and 7, the two branches are expected to
work in parallel, one assisting the party in its efforts to correct the prob-
lem, the other to apply consequences associated with the breach.
The process described is generally open. However, there are provi-
104. Such as little or no effort domestically by a large number of Annex I countries.
105. See Glenn Wiser & Donald M. Goldberg, The Compliance Fund: A New Tool for Achieving
Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol (Washington, D.C.: The Center for International Environmen-
tal Law, 1999), online: CIEL <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ComplianceFund.pdf>.
106. Marrakech Accords, supra note 2, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under
the Kyoto Protocol, Decision -/CP7, Part VIII, General Procedures, para. 3 at 134.
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sions in the compliance agreement'017 that can reduce or eliminate the trans-
parency of the process to a point where it risks losing its credibility. There
are broad powers, for example, to prevent information from being made
public until after the conclusion of the process. Similarly, there is provi-
sion for the hearings of the enforcement branch to take place in private.
These powers could undermine the progressive provisions in the compli-
ance agreement, which allow for submissions from intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations. Depending on the exercise of discretion,
particularly by the enforcement branch, the process could be either open
and transparent, or cloaked in secrecy. Most Parties to the negotiations
seemed to value transparency and participation by non-Parties, and it was
mainly due to the strong bargaining position of Russia, as a key party for
the coming into force of the Protocol without ratification by the U.S., that
these powers to restrict access were included. It would be reasonable to
expect, particularly given the composition of the two branches, that these
powers will not be exercised.
The agreement provides for an appeal process, but it is limited to due
process issues. The Conference of the Parties (COP) will serve as the ap-
peal body, and the decision being appealed will stand pending the appeal.
This will ensure that the appeal process, which can take some time given
that the COP generally only meets once a year, is not used as a way to delay
application of consequences of non-compliance.
The most difficult issue throughout the negotiations on compliance,
and the one compliance issue that remained unresolved until the last mo-
ments in Marrakech was the issue of legally binding consequences. Lead-
ing up to The Hague, there was a growing momentum toward legally bind-
ing consequences, with only three countries remaining opposed by the end
of negotiations in The Hague. 108 As a result, Parties started to turn their
attention to the Article 18 problem of how to make such consequences
applicable to everyone who ratified the Protocol. One proposed solution
was to make acceptance of the amendment a condition of eligibility to use
the mechanisms. Other proposals would have tied acceptance of legally
binding consequences to the acceptance of the second commitment period
targets.
In the course of negotiations in Bonn, momentum continued to be in
favour of legally binding consequences, however, the negotiating dynam-
107. Ibid., Part VII1, General Procedures, paras. 4-6 at 134; Ibid., Part IX, Procedures for the En-
forcement Branch, para. 2 at 135; Ibid., Part X, Expedited Procedures for the Enforcement Branch,
para. I at 136.
108. Japan, Russia, and Australia.
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ics had changes as a result of the U.S. decision to pull out of the negotia-
tions. This gave Japan, and Russia a much stronger position to oppose
legally binding consequences, and these two countries were successful in
achieving a last minute change to the Bonn agreement to delay the deci-
sion on this issue until the first meeting of the Parties to the Protocol, after
it came into force. This had the effect to making it even more difficult to
establish a link between acceptance of an amendment under Article 18 and
some other step or process that countries would want to participate in,
thereby assuring that the same compliance rules would apply to everyone.
The difficulty with retaining the link between mechanisms' eligibility
and an amendment under Article 18 post Bonn was that the content of the
Article 18 has not been determined. This could result in Parties agreeing to
a link without knowing what would be included under the Article 18 amend-
ment. This problem arises out of the amending formula under Article 20,
which requires only 3/4 majority for agreement on the text of an amend-
ment. This means Parties could be forced through the eligibility link to
accept something, without having control over its content. One solution
proposed was to make it a condition of the link between the Article 18
amendment and mechanisms' eligibility that the text of the Article 18
amendment be adopted unanimously by the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol. This solution was rejected. As a result, even if there is agreement
to amend the Protocol to provide for legally binding consequences, there
may not be any way to ensure ratification of that amendment until the
second commitment period. This is unfortunate given the importance for
each party to know that all Parties are committed to meeting their emission
reduction obligations.
If Parties had been serious about preserving the possibility of legally
binding consequences, as agreed to in Bonn, the problem could have been
overcome. By not choosing to agree to the link between eligibility and the
amendment on legally binding consequences in case of an amendment
reached by consensus, an opportunity to strengthen the compliance regime
was lost. This approach would, on the one hand, have protected states who
are not yet convinced that legally binding consequences are the way to go.
On the other hand, it would preserve a way to ensure that in case of consen-
sus on this point at COP/MOP 1, countries could ratify the amendment
with some assurance that everyone would. It is unfortunate that this oppor-
tunity was lost in Marrakech. The direction of the negotiations on this is-
sue would suggest that some countries were still looking to the compliance
system as a release valve in case they had underestimated the effort re-
quired for compliance.
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5. Developing Country Issues'0 9
There is a tendency to focus on Annex I countries for purposes of the
Kyoto Protocol, because for the first commitment period, only Annex I
countries have accepted binding targets for emission reductions. Further-
more, as discussed above, developing countries were not a significant fac-
tor in the crucial stages of the negotiations, from the failed meeting in The
Hague in November 2000 to the agreement in Marrakech a year later. The
relationship that develops between Annex I and developing countries is
however crucial for a number of reasons, even at this stage. First of all,
developing countries are likely to be the first to suffer the consequences of
climate change, and are least likely to have the capacity to respond. They
also have contributed the least to the problem to date.
The Framework Convention recognizes this, as do the Kyoto Protocol
and Marrakech Accords by requiring Annex I countries to go first in re-
ducing emissions, by providing for adaptation funding,"' by requiring
Annex I countries to strive to minimize effects of mitigation measures on
developing countries,"' and by providing for capacity building, technol-
ogy transfer and financial assistance to developing countries." 2 Develop-
ing countries did make some progress in pushing their issues, but progress
was limited, especially after the failure of negotiations in The Hague and
the subsequent U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiations.
The most interesting question for the next few years will be whether
Annex I countries have agreed to do enough under Kyoto to have the basis
under the Framework Convention to convince developing countries to take
on emissions targets. Without developing country committments of some
109. For a general discussion of equity issues under the Kyoto Protocol, see Batruch, supra note 27;
V Bhaskar, "Distributive Justice and the Control of Global Warming" in V Bhaskar & Andrew
Glyn, eds., The North the South and the Environment (London, England: United Nations University
Press, 1995) 102; Michael Grubb, "Seeking fair weather: ethics and the international debate on
climate change" (1995) 71 Int'l Aff. 463; Eileen Claussen & Lisa McNeilly, The Complex Elements
of Global Fairness (Washington, D.C.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 1998), online: Pew
Center on Global Climate Change <http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/pol-equity-bak/
pol-equity.pdf>.
110. Supra note 2, Decision -/CP.7 (Article 12), para. 15 at 71. 2 % of CDM credits are designated
for an adaptation fund.
11. See supra note 1, art. 3.14; and Marrakech Accords, ibid., Decision -/CP7, Part H. Matters
Relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol at 46.
112. See Marrakech Accords, ibid., Decision -/CR7, Part A. Capacity Building in Developing Coun-
tries (non-Annex I Parties) at 6; Part C. Development and Transfer of Technologies (decisions 4/
CP4 and 9/CP.5) at 22; Part D. Implementation of Article 4, Paragraph 8 and 9, of the Convention
(decision 3/CP3 and Article 2, Paragraph 3, and Article 3, Paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol) at
32; Part E. Additional Guidance to an Operating Entity of the Financial Mechanism at 40; Part E
Funding under the Convention, and Part I. Funding under the Kyoto Protocol at 43.
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form, it is unlikely that UG countries will take on the kinds of targets re-
quired to make meaningful progress toward the long term goal of stabiliz-
ing concentrations at save levels. It is expected that this debate will begin
in earnest at COP 10. Depending on developments in the U.S., the negotia-
tions over developing country targets for the second commitment period
are likely to be further complicated by the question of U.S. participation in
future commitment periods, especially given that the current U.S. opposi-
tion to Kyoto is in large part due to the absence of targets for developing
countries.
Conclusion
For anyone looking for Parties to make commitments that will signifi-
cantly reduce the threat of climate change the Kyoto Protocol and the
Marrakech Accords are clearly a disappointment. The impact of Annex I
countries meeting the first commitment period targets on the world's cli-
mate is likely to be negligible. Even before additional concessions were
made in the negotiations leading to the Marrakech Accords, the impact of
the first commitment period targets was considered to be relatively small.
According to Environment Canada estimates, implementation would de-
lay concentrations from reaching double pre-industrialized levels by about
20 years, but it would not prevent concentrations from doubling or even
tripling."' 3
Due to its heavy reliance on sinks and flexibility mechanisms, the Kyoto
Protocol will also be a disappointment to those who are looking for these
targets to put Annex I countries on the road to making the fundamental
changes necessary to achieve more significant reductions in the longer
term. Examples of such long term measures would include changes in ur-
ban planning, changes to transportation infrastructures, shifts to renew-
able sources of energy, as well as investment in conservation. While the
Kyoto Protocol does not preclude any of these measures, it is based on the
principle of identifying the lowest cost measures to meet the short term
(i.e., first commitment period) target without, in itself, encouraging Par-
ties to consider the longer term, either from a climate change perspective
or with a few minor exceptions, to consider other environmental, social, or
equity issues in deciding how to meet the Kyoto target.
On the other hand, it seems clear from the negotiations to date that
until there is agreement on how to decide what kind of relative allocation
113. Based on a presentation by Steven Szabo, Regional Climate Change Manager, Environment
Canada, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May, 2001.
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of the obligation to reduce emissions is economically fair, and how to en-
sure that this economic balance is achieved, it is unlikely that there will be
a meaningful coordinated international response to climate change."14 The
framework negotiated in Kyoto and completed in Marrakech provides a
starting point for agreement on the allocation of the economic costs and
benefits. It would likely be futile to start over again, given that the out-
come of Kyoto and Marrakech must be seen as a reflection of the current
state of commitment of Parties to contribute to the resolution of this global
environmental problem.
The immediate challenge will be to learn through implementation.
Parties need to confirm through experience what country will be impacted
how, and be willing to make the necessary adjustments to keep and bring
all countries into the Kyoto framework, including the U.S. and developing
countries. Only at that point can meaningful international targets to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions be expected. In the meantime, the added benefit
of continuing these negotiations in the context of the UNFCCC and Kyoto
is that there seems to be a commitment to the baseline of 1990, which
provides an incentive for voluntary early action by all Parties, particularly
Annex I Parties, whether or not they are Parties to the Protocol, or intend
to become Parties for purposes of the first commitment period.
The long term challenge, however may be to prevent the economic
measures established in Kyoto and Marrakech from becoming the end as
opposed to one limited means for reaching it. If the Kyoto Protocol results
in a long term course of measuring progress on climate change in terms of
short term lowest cost measures to reduce emissions, regardless of what
the collateral costs and benefits without some form of full cost accounting
to ensure that the measures chosen are actually in our long term best inter-
est, then Marrakech will prove to be a mirage. 1I5 To be fair to the process
set up through the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords, they do not
prevent Parties from considering those collateral costs and benefits, but
they do very little to encourage consideration of these factors. The politi-
cal reality in many of the Annex I countries is that a long term vision of a
sustainable future may be difficult to implement.
A real opportunity to assist countries in that process has been lost in
not allowing those countries to point to the international regime under the
Kyoto Protocol as the reason for taking such a course. Instead, whether
114. Whether or not the Kyoto Protocol comes into force.
115. For a more detailed discussion of the limitations of the market to promote good public policy on
social and environmental issues, see Lily N. Chinn, "Can the Market be Fair and Efficient? An envi-
ronmental justice critique of emissions trading" (1999) 26 Ecology L.Q, 80.
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countries look to the price of carbon in the stock market to decide what to
do to achieve their Article 3.1 targets regardless of lost opportunities to
achieve long term environmental, social, equity, and economic objectives,
will be left to the political climate in each country to decide. It is that
choice more than anything else that will answer the ultimate question posed
in this article, will Parties wander aimlessly through the desert, chasing
one mirage after another, or will Marrakech lead Parties to an oasis of
sustainability? Marrakech itself clearly is not the final oasis, and time will
tell whether it will help or hinder Parties' search for it, whether it is a
mirage that will lead Parties astray, or "an oasis on the way" to re-energize
Parties' efforts.
It is important to keep in mind that many European countries have
been able to achieve emissions on aper capita basis around half of those in
North America without any international framework to preserve an eco-
nomic level playing field. Properly motivated, similar results are possible
in North America and Australia, and the real motivation will not come
from the Kyoto Protocol or any other international agreement, but out of a
realization that renewable energy, energy conservation and efficiency, re-
duction in consumption and production, public transportation, and the pro-
tection of our forests, oceans and biodiversity are in the best interests of
human kind. The current state of developments in international law on
climate change is simply a reflection of how much further from a sustain-
able path Australia, the U.S. and Canada currently are.
One of the difficulties this has created for the negotiations has been the
lack of commitment to the long term objective. Instead, it has been on the
short term economic fairness or unfairness that has dominated the eco-
nomic balance part of the negotiations. Major adjustments to the alloca-
tion are inevitable, considering the significant inequity in terms of per
capita emissions. One of a number of solutions to this inequity is the con-
cept of "contract and converge.""' 6 It refers to an approach of reducing
global emissions while bringing per capita emissions closer together. Such
an approach will put increasing pressure on three countries, Australia, U.S.
and Canada, with per capita emissions almost double the average emis-
sions in other Annex I countries.
The process of working out the relative burden of the various partici-
pants is complicated by the fact that the political will to act is the lowest in
116. See Global Commons Institute, online: GCI <http://www.gci.org.uk/>, for technical support
and information concerning "Contraction and Convergence." A planning model, "Contraction and
convergence Options," is also available for download.
From Kyoto to Marrakech; A Long Walk through the Desert: Mirage or Oasis? 163
countries that have the highest per capita emissions. At the same time, this
is where most of the reductions, at least on a per capita basis, will have to
be made in the long term. So while this experiment with the Kyoto targets
will provide Parties with useful information on which to base negotiations
for long term targets, the battle over the relative effort of various Parties
has just begun.
It would be naive to assume that with some minor adjustments to the
Kyoto targets based on the experience with the first commitment periods,
countries will simply agree to reduce everyone's assigned amount propor-
tionally for future commitment periods, and at the same time add targets
for developing countries. Some countries, such as Sweden, have already
reduced their per capita emissions to about a third of those in Canada and
the U.S.. Can they really be expected to accept further reductions until
emissions in the U.S. and Canada have come down to somewhere close to
their per capita emissions, accounting for national circumstances? Simi-
larly, with the relatively modest targets accepted by countries like the U.S.
and Canada, can the international community really expect developing coun-
tries to accept obligations that are anything more than symbolic until the
emissions from Annex I countries on a per capita basis are somewhere in
the same ball park as per capita emissions from developing countries?
What can we expect out of all this? Will international efforts be limited
to the lowest common denominator in the long term? There are some signs
of hope in this regard. As a starting point, it seems likely that the Protocol
will be ratified by enough countries to come into force by 2003, even if
ratification by the U.S. and Australia does not take place. At the time of
publication, ratification by Russia would be sufficient, and while it is dif-
ficult to predict what Russia will do, it does stand to gain economically
from ratification, at least in the short term.
Beyond this, there are signs that individual nations are prepared to lead
the way, or follow a developing international consensus and thereby raise
the bar. Sweden, for example, has announced a national commitment to
not only exceed its share of the EU obligation under the Protocol, but to do
so without reliance on sinks or the mechanisms. This means a significant
step forward, given that per capita emissions in Sweden are already the
lowest of any Annex I country. "7 Sweden is taking on the role of continu-
117. See Sweden's CO2 Equivalent Per Person Emissions in 1994 compared with the figures for the
U.S. and other Annex 1 countries. Sweden reported 7.7 tonnes while the U.S. had 23.7 for the same
reporting period. See generally the UNFCCC's online Greenhouse Gas Inventory Database <http://
ghg.unfecc.int/>.
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ing to make the case that reductions do not have to come at the cost of
quality of life. There are also signs that U.K. is preparing to lead the way in
making drastic long term reductions, with long term emission reduction
goals of 60% or more.118 The need for such reductions has also been con-
sidered in North America, even if so far just at the provincial and state
level." 9 Finally, there are significant efforts under way in the U.S. to re-
duce emissions, at least at the local and state levels. This gives some hope
that in the absence of a national commitment to this issue in the U.S., states
such as California may lead the way on this issue in North America in the
way they have on vehicle emission standards.
Let us now return to the questions posed at the beginning of this
article:
1. Assuming ratification and compliance, what is the role of the Kyoto
Protocol in achieving the environmental and equity goals set in the
UNFCCC?
We have seen as a starting point that Kyoto as negotiated in 1997 was a
modest step forward at best in terms of the environmental and equity
goals of the UNFCCC. The greenhouse gas emission reductions are
minor, and they are limited to developed countries (most likely minus
the U.S.). In terms of equity, Kyoto requires little of developing coun-
tries for now and takes some modest steps in terms of capacity build-
ing and other assistance to developing countries. The combination of
very modest obligations for developed countries and little in terms of
obligations or assistance for developing countries points to the funda-
mental issue to be resolved before meaningful progress can be made:
what is the relative obligation of the developed versus the developing
world to address climate change? Clearly the fact that this issue is
unresolved resulted in both the environmental and equity goals of the
UNFCCC not being addressed in any serious way in Kyoto and
118. See the Department of Trade and Industry (UK), Energy White Paper. Our Energy Future-
Creating a Low Carbon Economy (Norwich: The Stationary Office, 2003), online: DTI Energy
Group <http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/whitepaper/ourenergyfuture.pdf>.
119. For a copy of the resolutions issued during the New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Pre-
miers Annual Conference held in August 2001 at Westbrook, Connecticut, see the Government of
Nova Scotia website: <http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/details.asp?id=20010827004>. The detail with
respect to the agreement on climate change is contained in: The committee on the Environment and
the Northeast International Committee on Energy of the Conference of New England Governors and
Eastern Canadian Premiers, Climate Change Action Plan 2001 (New England Governors/Eastern
Canadian Premiers, 2001), online: The Council of Atlantic Premiers <http://www.cmp.ca/negecp/
en-ccap.pdf>.
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Marrakech. In terms of the process from Kyoto to Marrakech, the rules
negotiated in Marrakech suggest a further erosion of the environmen-
tal objectives, certainly in terms of the rules for the clean development
mechanism, and most notably with respect to the expansion of the use
of sinks under Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Marrakech did not
provide much in terms of further assistance to developing countries.
Nor are there any signs of overcoming the general impasse between
developed countries who want developing countries to take on targets,
and developing countries who take the position that there has not been
sufficient commitment to this issue shown by the developed world.
Most notable, perhaps, in terms of developments from 1997 to 2001,
however, has been the decision of the current U.S. administration to
reject the Kyoto Protocol, again a reflection of the impasse over the
relative rights and obligations of developed versus developing nations.
2. Are the reporting/monitoring/verification procedures sufficient to en-
sure the integrity of the obligations taken on?
As we saw in Section 4.3, above, the rules negotiated, while favouring
an efficient trading system over promoting implementation policies
that maximize environmental benefits and equity, should prove suffi-
cient to ensure the integrity of the obligations taken on for compliance
purposes. This should provide a sufficient basis for future negotia-
tions, in terms of more meaningful targets by developed countries, and
the negotiation of targets for developing countries. The data gathered
through this process should also provide the basis for an assessment of
which mechanisms have a constructive role to play in a long term in-
ternational climate change regime, which need to be adjusted, and which
may have to be eliminated.
3. Is the compliance system strong enough to ensure a reasonable level
of compliance, especially considering uncertainty over who will ratify,
the economic uncertainties, and the limited capacity in many coun-
tries to implement obligations in the Protocol?
A number of opportunities to strengthen the compliance system were
lost. Examples include the question of liability for overselling of credits,
lost opportunities in terms of eligibility requirements for use of the
mechanisms, and the unwillingness of the parties to commit to legally
binding consequences. At the same time, the compliance system is
likely to prove to be the strongest of any MEA, and if it proves to be
insufficient, there are some procedurally simple ways to enhance the
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system for future commitment periods. Overall, the compliance sys-
tem must be considered one of the strengths of the Kyoto process.
A consideration of these three questions provides a very mixed
picture of the role Kyoto will likely play in the long term on this issue.
It has resulted in international cooperation, for the first time, on this
issue. It includes binding targets, and perhaps the strongest compli-
ance system of any MEA. It has relatively rigorous reporting and veri-
fication procedures. But the targets are modest. They are inadequate
to address the issue, based on the best science available to date. They
do not yet include developing countries, soon to be the source of the
majority of emissions. The worst polluter, the U.S., is not part of this
international effort.
In order to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC, the following
will have to happen over the next couple of decades. The U.S. has to be
brought back into the process. The question of how to allocate the
ultimate burden between developed and developing countries has to
be resolved. In this context, it is important to note that developed coun-
tries are facing a further reduction of about 80% below business as
usual. 2 ° Serious flaws in some of the mechanisms, such as the clean
development mechanism and sinks, also have to be worked out.
These are tremendous challenges. At the same time, in spite of
these, Kyoto should be seen as a major step forward for a number of
reasons. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is
actually being put into practice. For the first time, this is taking place
in a context where the economic stakes are high. By implementing
reduction targets for most of the developed world, we are turning the
corner by limiting the per capita emissions in the countries with the
highest emissions per person. Finally, Kyoto signals the start of a new
era, that of a carbon constrained world. There is every reason to be-
lieve that this was the most difficult step, and that the signal sent with
the ratification and implementation of Kyoto will spur innovation the
way the Montreal Protocol did for ozone depleting substances, where
technology soon overtook internationally negotiated targets, at least in
the developed world. We may not have found the oasis in Marrakech,
but at least we are starting to move in the right direction.
120. See Kevin A. Baumert (with Odile Blanchard, Silvia Llosa & James F. Perkaus), ed., Building
on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate (Washington, D.C.: World Resources
Institute, 2002), online: WRI <http://pdf.wri.org/opc-full.pdf>.
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So while Kyoto is terribly inadequate, environmentally and from
an equity perspective, given the process to get to this point, it is likely
the best hope of moving beyond the current impasse to get to real re-
ductions. The hope is that Kyoto will do three things:
1. It will give us valuable information about the relative and absolute
economic impacts of greenhouse gas emission reductions,
2. It has focussed the international negotiations toward some of the
fundamental issues that need to be resolved to make real progress
on this and other global environmental issues, and
3. It can serve as the pilot phase to weed out things that don't work
(i.e., CDM, sinks, JI, ET?) and are not worth including once we get
to the serious job of making real reductions globally.
Marrakech may not be the oasis we have been looking for, but it
has the potential to provide the map to find it, perhaps in the course of
negotiating the third commitment period targets, the first set of targets
likely to be negotiated after 2012, the conclusion of the pilot phase.

